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The existence of stark and enduring gender inequalities in political participation
and representation around the world is a well-documented phenomenon. What
constrains women from participating in politics? How can we encourage more
women to participate? What are the substantive implications of nominal equal-
ity in participation? In this dissertation, I explore these questions in the context of
Pakistan: a developing democracy with high levels of gender inequality on various
dimensions. An overarching goal of this work is to center the role of the household
– and the sexual division of household labor – in our understanding of gender roles
and gendered inequalities in political participation. In Paper 1, I develop an orig-
inal behavioral measure of preference expression, embedded in a survey with 800
respondents in Faisalabad, to demonstrate that even when women participate in
political communication, they overwhelmingly opt to communicate their spouse’s
political preferences to a political representative, rather than their own. The ability
to express and communicate preferences is key to many definitions of democracy.
While existing work studies external constraints on preference expression in the
public sphere, in this paper I demonstrate the persistence of internal constraints
on women’s preference expression that operate in the private sphere. In Paper 2,
coauthored with Ali Cheema, Asad Liaqat and Shandana KhanMohmand, we use
a field experiment conducted in 2500 households in Lahore to study what works to
mobilize women’s turnout. The design of the experiment relies on the understand-
ing that women’s participation in this context is shaped by household level con-
straints. We testwhether targeting a canvassing treatment prior to the 2018 Pakistan
National Election emphasizing the importance of women’s vote works best when
targeted to women, men, or both. We find that it is insufficient to target women,
and necessary to target men, in order to increase women’s electoral turnout. In Pa-
per 3, I draw on the conceptual framework of role equity and role transformation
to understand variation in public attitudes towards gender equality. I use survey
data collected in Faisalabad and Lahore to demonstrate how abstract support for
gender equality in various domains breaks down in the face of material costs and
circumstances that pose a threat to status-quo gender roles.
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The 2013 General Elections in Pakistan were a defining moment in the country’s
experience with electoral democracy. They marked the first transfer of power from
one democratically elected government to another, thus fulfilling Przeworski et al.
(2000)’s minimalist definition of an electoral democratic regime for the first time in
Pakistan’s history. As Iwrite this in 2019, after another democratic transfer of power
under the 2018 elections, progress on a broader set of democratic freedoms re-
mains stalled and uneven. In particular, citizens are far from enjoying Dahl (1973)’s
ideal of unimpaired opportunities to formulate, signify and have their preferences
weighted equally in the conduct of government. Importantly, these freedoms, to
the extent that they exist, are unequally distributed along gender lines: women
remain systematically and disproportionately excluded from these opportunities.
The subject of this dissertation is the nature, causes, and consequences of this sys-
tematic exclusion.
In three complementary essays, this dissertation analyzes gender inequalities in
political participation in Pakistan, with particular attention to how intra-household
inequality and gender roles borne out of the sexual division of household labor
shape these inequalities. It joins a body of recent comparative work on gender
and political participation in the developing world which addresses gender gaps
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in political preferences (Gottlieb, Grossman and Robinson, 2016; Brule and Gaik-
wad, 2017), centers the role of the family andhousehold (Chhibber, 2002; Prillaman,
2017), and interrogates the role of gender as a shaping force in men and women’s
political lives (Robinson and Gottlieb, 2019). In interrogating the causes of inequal-
ity in political participation, the project speaks to the research agenda identified by
Burns, Schlozman and Verba (2001) in The Private Roots of Public Action to under-
standpersisting gender inequalities in political participation by examining inequal-
ities in nonpolitical life.
Methodologically, I rely primarily on quantitative analysis of original survey
data collected through two surveys conducted in the Faisalabad and Lahore dis-
tricts of Pakistan. In all three papers, the design of survey measures – and in the
case of Paper 2, the design of the canvassing intervention – is informed by inter-
views and conversations with politicians, party workers, civil rights activists, and
government officials conducted in Lahore and Islamabad between 2015-18, as well
as focus group discussions conducted with men and women voters in Lahore dur-
ing 2017-18. I also make use of experimental methods as a tool for measurement
and causal identification in this dissertation. In Paper 1, I conduct a measurement
experiment, employing a randomized cost strategy to measure respondents’ valu-
ation of their own preferences relative to those of their spouse, and the sensitivity
of this valuation tomonetary costs. Paper 2 draws on a large-scale voter canvassing
field experiment, conducted with 2500 households in collaboration with civil soci-
ety and government partners in advance of the 2018 General Elections in Pakistan.
Paper 3 employs a randomized informational treatment embedded in a survey to
causally identify the effect of providing accurate information about levels of gender
inequality in education on respondents’ support for gender-equalizing policy.
The task of describing levels and patterns of gender inequality is integral to
this dissertation. When I began fieldwork in Pakistan, I embarked on a long chase
2
to obtain gender disaggregated turnout data at the constituency level for the 2013
elections. I heard different stories along theway, and for awhilewas convinced that
the data existed, but that I was unable to access it. However, during an interview in
2015, an official at the Election Commission of Pakistan revealed to me that the rel-
evant administrative reporting form for returns at the polling station level was not
formatted for separately reporting men and women’s turnout in 2013. As a result,
the votes frommale and female polling booths inmixed gender polling boothswere
pooled, counted and reported in the aggregate. While it was possible to retrieve
partial information about the gender gap in turnout by looking solely at polling sta-
tion returns for separate men and women’s polling stations, I have become increas-
ingly convinced that the gender disaggregated data frommixed polling stations in
2013 simply do not exist. In the absence of these data, it is difficult to assess the true
extent of the gender gap in voter turnout in Pakistan’s 2013 election. I once received
a file from a journalist reporting the gender gap in turnout at the constituency level
in the 2013 elections, but given the absence of these turnout numbers at the polling
station level, I remain wary of using this data. The 2018 election data is a different
story, where the gender disaggregated turnout data at the polling station level is
publicly available for nearly every polling station in the country, though not dig-
itized for analysis at the time of writing this. In a data-scarce environment, the
task of description becomes all the more important to understand the true extent
of inequality, patterns of variation and potential drivers of this variation. I hope
that the data collection conducted as part of this project can enhance our collective
understanding of patterns of gender inequality in the political sphere in Pakistan,
and help us tell more nuanced stories about the issue.
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Paper 1: Count Me Out
In Paper 1, I focus on 2 key questions: 1) do men and women have different prefer-
ences for public goods and services? 2) do men and women express these prefer-
ences at different rates? I use a face-to-face survey conducted in 800 households in
the Faisalabad district of Pakistan to show that men and women within the same
household prioritize systematically different public goods and services. These dif-
ferences in preferences map on to the disproportionate benefits of various goods
and services that accrue to men and women as a result of the gendered division of
household labor. Using a novel behavioral measure of political communication, I
demonstrate that women attach a lower value to their distinctive preferences than
men, and are less willing to communicate these preferences to political representa-
tives. Evenwhen offered a free and anonymized opportunity to communicate pref-
erences to their local representative, women, who may not otherwise have many
opportunities for such communication, overwhelmingly choose to pass on their
spouse’s preferences instead of their own. Meanwhile, men, who otherwise have
much higher rates of contact with local representatives, still use the opportunity to
pass on their own preferences rather than their spouses. The gendered asymme-
try in preference expression and communication has implications for democratic
theories of representation: it suggests that the link between political participation
and substantive representation may be undermined by constraints to preference
expression faced by women.
Does the gender gap in preference expression “matter” becausemen andwomen
actually hold different preferences, and potentially have divergent interests? In
other words, if men and women within the same household were to hold exactly
the same preferences, should we still care about whose preferences are commu-
nicated to political representatives? I would argue yes, and rely on Mansbridge’s
formulation to defend this:
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One problem with blithely forsaking political equality on the grounds
that interests are equal is that power acquired in one decision carries
over to another. If one person consistently is more able to get others
to do what they would otherwise not do, this inequality may not be
relevant when interests are identical, but it becomes relevant as soon
as interests diverge, which they are bound to do at some point. The
community’s reliance on that person gives her or him greater political
resources when interests diverge. In short, political equality may be ir-
relevant at any one moment, but it must be maintained against the day
when it will be essential. On an individual level, even when two people
assess their interests as identical not only at present but for the foresee-
able future, they may want to feel free to change in unpredictable ways
so that their interests would begin to diverge; and to hedge against this
possibility by maintaining equal power between them. (Mansbridge,
1977)
On the one hand, this paper does document the existence of intra-household
differences in men and women’s preferences. However, I would argue that the
substantively and significantly large gender gap in preference expression also doc-
umented in the paper presents a fundamental problem of inequality in the politi-
cal sphere, regardless of the content of men and women’s preferences, which may
change, converge or diverge at different times and in different contexts.
Paper 2: Canvassing the Gatekeepers
This paper, coauthoredwithAli Cheema, AsadLiaqat and ShandanaKhanMohmand,
uses a field experiment conducted with 2500 households in the city of Lahore to
study the impact of a voter canvassing campaign on women’s turnout in the 2018
Pakistan General Election. The design of the canvassing campaign draws on a rich
literature identifying various factors that may constrain women’s political partici-
pation: gender gaps in political knowledge, civic skills, mobilization, and gendered
“psyche” (Burns, Schlozman and Verba, 2001; Fox and Lawless, 2010; Preece, 2016).
The experiment follows a factorial design, whereby the campaign is randomly tar-
geted at either women in households, men in households, or both. The variation
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in targeting is rooted in the understanding emerging from Paper 1 that women are
not always making autonomous decisions about their own political participation.
Rather, men may act as gatekeepers of women’s participation, by either 1) explic-
itly preventing women from participating, as documented anecdotally in the case
of community bans on women’s voting in certain parts of Pakistan, or 2) implicitly
dampening the potential for participation insofar as womenmay internalize norms
of permission-seeking and deference tomen, as evinced by the patterns of behavior
documented in Paper 1.
Through comparing differences in voter turnout, which is visually verified by
observing the indelible ink mark on study participants’ thumbs in the days follow-
ing the 2018 Election, across study households, we find that non-partisan canvass-
ing only improves women’s turnout when canvassers target men in households.
Targeting women alone is insufficient to effect changes in women’s political partic-
ipation on Election Day. Moreover we find that the canvassing campaign does not
seem to produce improvements among women on standard individual predictors
of political participation i.e. political knowledge, interest or self-efficacy. However,
using a costly behavioral measure of support for women’s role in democracy, we
find that menwhowere targeted with the canvassing treatment express higher lev-
els of support for women’s role in democracy beyond Election Day. Results from
a post-election survey also suggest that households where both men and women
received the treatment saw greater political discussion among men and women,
and that men in these households were more likely to provide logistical support
such as transport assistance to women on Election Day. Overall, we find that the
campaign is able to increase women’s electoral turnout without positively impact-
ing women’s individual resources or motivation, but rather by influencing men in
households.
Taken together, these findings provide suggestive evidence for male gatekeep-
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ing as a binding constraint on women’s participation. They have theoretical im-
plications for understanding women’s political participation in a context where
women enjoy limited agency within the household, and practical implications for
designing effective interventions to improvewomen’s participationunder such con-
ditions.
Paper 3: Limits to Equality
This paper draws on survey data from 800 households in Faisalabad and 2500
households in Lahore to understand variation within and across individuals in
public attitudes around gender inequality in two issue areas: 1) women’s polit-
ical participation and 2) girls’ education. I assess the extent to which Gelb and
Palley (1982)’s classification scheme of gender issues into issues of role equity or
role change is helpful in explaining variation in support for equality across issues.
I find that reported support for women’s equal participation in politics is highly
sensitive to perceived threats to status-quo gender roles. Within the domain of
political participation, activities like voting that pose a lower challenge to status-
quo gender roles enjoy greater public perception of “appropriateness." At the same
time, activities themselves are not inherently threatening or non-threatening to gen-
der roles; rather their construction as such depends highly on political elites’ fram-
ing. I demonstrate how this operates in the case of public perceptions of the appro-
priateness of women’s rally attendance in the leadup to the 2018 election.
I also explore public attitudes and support for equalizing policy in a different
domain: girls’ schooling, an issuewhere unlike political participation, there is pop-
ular consensus on the equal importance of girls’ participation. I hypothesize that
for an issue like equal access to education, which is more likely to be seen as a
role equity than a role change issue, public support for policy that promotes girls’
schooling is likely to be sensitive to perceived levels of inequality and the need for
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the policy rather than its appropriateness. I test this by looking observationally at the
levels of support for initiatives for girls education at different levels of perceived in-
equality, and by randomly providing respondents information about the true level
of inequality to testwhether learning accurate informationmakes themmore or less
supportive of policies that would reduce inequality. I find a complicated picture:
while women’s attitudes follow the hypothesized pattern, and women respond in
the expectedway to accurate information by increasing their support for the policy,
the pattern for men’s attitudes is reverse of expectations.
While the role equity and role change classification of gender issues provides a
useful common framework to think about public attitudes towards gender issues,
added attention to elite framing strategies, and howmen andwomen perceive gen-
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I develop and test a theory of how gender inequality within the household is repro-
duced in the political sphere, and undermines prospects for women’s substantive
representation. Drawing on an original face-to-face survey conducted in 800 house-
holds in the Faisalabad district of Pakistan, I show that men and women within the
same household prioritize systematically different public goods and services based
on the context-specific division of household labor. Using a novel behavioral mea-
sure of political communication, I demonstrate that women attach a lower value to
their distinctive preferences than men, and are less willing to communicate these
preferences to political representatives. The gendered asymmetry in preference as-
sertion has implications for democratic theories of representation: it suggests that
the link between political participation and substantive representation may be un-
dermined by gender inequality within the household.
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1.1 Introduction
Does increased political participation by women result in the improved represen-
tation of their preferences? Government responsiveness to citizen preferences is a
foundational goal for democracy. Attention and responsiveness to citizen prefer-
ences, concerns, and interests is also what constitutes “substantive representation”
(Pitkin, 1967)2. However, women, as a group, have historically been denied the
opportunity to express their preferences. Prior to universal suffrage, women were
explicitly excluded from the right to vote – an institutional guarantee necessary for
signifying preferences in a democracy –thus precluding any electoral incentive for
representatives to appeal to them, or account for their preferences. Today, despite
widespread de jure guarantees for political equality, women continue to face sig-
nificant barriers to equal political participation and representation. What explains
the disjuncture between de jure guarantees to equality and the de facto conditions
of political inequality that exist between men and women? This question is of in-
terest for scholars of democracy, policymakers, and advocates for women’s rights.
Moreover, it is one with substantial consequences for women’s welfare.
To answer this question, I draw attention to the role of the household as a medi-
ator between citizens and the state. I develop a theory of how household inequality
impacts both the content of men and women’s preferences, and their willingness
to express and assert these preferences. I test this using an original survey of 800
households, conducted in the Faisalabad district of the Punjab province, Pakistan,
which includes a novel behavioral measure of political communication with local
level representatives. The setting for the study allows us to better understand the
2Pitkin defines substantive representation as “acting in the interest of the represented, in aman-
ner responsive to them." However, the question of whether and how “women’s interests” can be de-
fined is a contested one, since it runs the risk of minimizing important differences and other salient
forms of group identity amongst women. See Celis et al. (2014) for an extensive review of the var-
ious theoretical and empirical approaches employed by scholars of gender and politics in recent
work on women’s representation.
11
prospects for women’s representation in a context where the stakes are especially
high: Pakistan ranked 143rd out of 144th on the Global Gender Gap Index in 20163.
The household is the most basic unit in many models of decision-making, but
treating it as a unit with common preferences obscures a set of complex within-
householddynamics. In recent years, development economists have pushed against
this unitary conceptualization of the household, instead drawing attention to the
existence of difference preferences among household members, the dynamics of
bargaining within the household, and gender asymmetries in bargaining power
(Agarwal, 1997; Sen, 1990). However, these intra-household dynamics are often ig-
nored in the study of political behavior. While there is ample work documenting
and seeking to explain persistent gender gaps in political participation and rep-
resentation in a variety of contexts4, empirical evidence on the link between intra-
household disparities and patterns of political inequality is somewhat scarce5. This
paper takes forward the research agenda of empirically investigating the “relation-
ship between inequality at home and citizen politics” identified by Burns, Schloz-
man and Verba (1997). I explore how hierarchies within the household shape the
content of men and women’s political preferences, and their relative willingness
to express those preferences. In order to represent citizen’s preferences, represen-
tatives need information on the content of those preferences. The willingness to
express and communicate preferences on part of citizens is therefore a prerequisite
for representation.
3The index is part of the Global Gender Gap Report, published annually since 2006 by the
World Economic Forum. It “quantifies the magnitude of gender disparities and tracks their
progress over time, with a specific focus on the relative gaps between women and men across
four key areas: health, education, economy and politics." See here for more details on construction
of the Index: http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2016/
measuring-the-global-gender-gap/
4See Kittilson (2016) for a recent review
5Notable exceptions include Burns, Schlozman and Verba (1997); Chhibber (2002); Iversen and
Rosenbluth (2010)
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I argue that the gendered division of labor within the household implies that
men andwomenwithin the samehousehold benefit differentially from certain pub-
lic goods and services, and that this shapes their preferences over public good pro-
vision. I identify significant differences in men and women’s stated preferences
over a set of local public goods and services in my survey sample. Women priori-
tize goods such as drinkingwater, healthcare, and income supplementing schemes,
which are likely to benefit them disproportionately. On the other hand men tend
to prioritize roads and transport, which they are more likely to use given their pat-
terns of frequent travel outside the home for work.
I also document stark gender differences in all self-reported forms of electoral
and inter-electoral political participation: voting, communication, rally/meeting
attendance, as well as in reported access to representatives at all levels of govern-
ment. Under-participation by women, coupled with a gender gap in preferences,
means that women’s distinctive demands and voices are systematically excluded
from political decision-making. Would women’s preferences be better represented
if women participated in higher numbers? I argue that higher levels of participa-
tion bywomenmay be necessary, but not sufficient, to guarantee the representation
of their preferences.
To demonstrate this, I employ a novel behavioral measure of preference expres-
sion which allows me to study how men and women respond differentially to an
equal opportunity to communicate their preferences to local representatives. When
facedwith a choice ofwhether to anonymously communicate their ownpreferences
to a local representative at no cost, a striking 76% of women forego the opportunity
to make their own preferences known, and instead choose to pass on their spouse’s
preferences. Men behave in exactly the opposite way: under the same conditions
of anonymity and no cost, 88% choose to communicate their own preferences over
their spouse’s. Moreover, women’s willingness to communicate their own prefer-
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ences decreases in how different they perceive their preferences being from their
spouse’s, as well as in how different their preferences actually are. Gender inequal-
ity in the preference expression thus persists even when the level of political par-
ticipation is held equal across men and women. However, in households where
women have greater bargaining power (as proxied by their opportunities outside
the household, and their status relative to their spouse), the patterns of political
expression are less distorted.
These findings have important implications for howwe understand the linkage
between citizens’ preferences, participation and representation. It appears that at
least under conditions of deep household inequality, the gains from improvements
in nominal levels of women’s political participation may be limited. Under such
conditions, women are demonstrably reticent to use opportunities to participate to
assert their ownpreferences. The prospects forwomen’s substantive representation
may be especially low when the stakes are highest, i.e. when women’s preferences
are substantively distinct from those of men, since that is when women are least
likely to make their preferences known.
The 1960s feminist rallying cry “personal is political" informs the design of this
study, and helps in making sense of the findings. In its original use, the phrase
has a consciousness raising function6. I use it as an invitation to consider seriously
the role of the private, personal sphere in understanding patterns in public and
political life. Past work has looked at how gender differences in individual level
resources (Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995), levels of political knowledge and
interest (Verba, Burns and Schlozman, 1997), community norms (Isaksson, Kot-
sadam and Nerman, 2014), and access to social networks (Prillaman, 2016) shape
patterns of women’s political participation and representation in various contexts.
6Crenshaw (1991) speaks of the “process of recognizing as social and systemic what was for-
merly perceived as isolated and individual” as key to the practice of identity politics by various
marginalized groups.
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This paper turns the focus onto the household and the family as a site with unique
explanatory power for these outcomes of interest.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the liter-
ature on women’s political preferences and participation, and outlines my theory
of how these factors interact to produce substantive representation. Section 1.3 de-
scribes the study context. Section 1.4 introduces the survey data, and describes the
behavioral measure of preference expression. Section 1.5 reports findings on pref-
erence heterogeneity within the household, and the results from the behavioral
measure. Section 1.6 examines the effects of differences in preferences, and within
household empowerment on individuals’ choice to express their preferences. Sec-
tion 1.7 concludes with a discussion of the implications for the link between polit-
ical participation and representation in gender unequal settings.
1.2 Theory and Related Literature
Preferences
Concerns about gender inequality in politics are in part motivated by the notion
of a gender gap in political preferences. In the case of women, this implies that
women, as a group, have distinctive preferences that go unheard when women are
excluded from the political sphere. In otherwords, the exclusion ofwomen’s voices
from politics has material and distributive consequences. The notion of a gender
gap in preferences has empirical support across a number of contexts. For instance,
work from advanced industrialized democracies demonstrates that women have a
greater preference for redistributive and leftist policies than their male counter-
parts (Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006; Inglehart and Norris, 2000).
It is likely that such gaps, if they exist, will be qualitatively different in the de-
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veloping world. For instance, it seems unlikely that women will have strong pref-
erences for redistribution in countries where state capacity is too low to provide
comprehensive welfare programs. Accordingly, existing empirical work on gender
gaps in preferences in the developingworld has focused on differential preferences
over locally provided public goods, services, and schemes, rather than program-
matic policies. Olken (2010) finds that women in Indonesia are far more likely than
men to prefer drinking water projects in their villages, and far less likely to prefer
projects involving roads and bridges. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004)’s seminal
study on the effects of village-level quotas for women in India reveals a similar pat-
tern: women in West Bengal and Rajasthan are more likely than men to complain
to their village representatives about issues related to water provision, and in Ra-
jasthan, like in Indonesia, they are less likely than men to make requests related
to roads. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Gottlieb, Grossman and Robinson (2016) analyze
Afrobarometer survey data to show that women are more likely than men to pri-
oritize drinking water and poverty alleviation schemes. Brule and Gaikwad (2017)
find that women belonging to patrilineal tribes in Meghalaya, India are on aver-
age more supportive of public welfare schemes and that unlike men, their support
does not decrease when they are reminded of the personal financial burden of such
schemes.
How do we reconcile these empirical patterns with the challenge to thinking of
women as a homogeneous group with a common set of preferences? Many con-
temporary feminist and gender studies scholars deemphasize the notion of shared
identity and shared interests of women, highlighting instead the heterogeneity of
women’s experiences (Weldon, 2011). However, Beckwith (2014), while acknowl-
edging the differences of experiences among women, points to the existence of
“similar shaping forces” in women’s lives that differ substantially frommen’s lives:
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Women’s lives are constructed in specific instances by political, eco-
nomic, and social arrangements that (1) shape their life histories and
life options, and (2) differ substantially from the shaping forces and tra-
jectories of men’s lives. This does not mean that all women experience
exactly the same lives or are subject to the same constraints or benefit
from the same advantages, but it does recognize that, within specific
contexts, similar shaping forces exist and have similar consequences for
women in a wide range of countries.
I argue that the household division of labor is one such “shaping force” or insti-
tution7. In particular, the sexual division of labor implies that differential benefits
accrue to men and women from universally provided public goods and services
and this influences their preferences over these goods. The household division
of labor helps us understand the relative preference for water revealed in studies
conducted in the Indonesian, Indian and sub-Saharan context where women are
largely responsible for the collection of drinking water. Thus, the provision of wa-
ter, while unarguably beneficial for the entire household and community at large,
disproportionately benefits women.
The existing studies discussed above document aggregate gender gaps in pref-
erences for public good and service provision in the developing world. This pa-
per however, provides evidence that such such gaps exist among male and female
members within the same households. It is thus a more direct test of the notion that
conditionswithin the household, at least in part, drive these preference differences.
I further argue that as a consequence of the gendered division of labor, the roles
and tasks performed by men and women within the household are not just differ-
ent in content, but also different in how they are valued. Specifically, the unpaid
work within the home, performed disproportionately by women, is valued lower
than than the paid work outside the home, performed disproportionately by men.
7Htun (2005) suggests that a conceptualization of gender as a “social position” is useful for
political science questions. She suggests that this social positionmanifests itself in three institutions:
the sexual division of labor, normative heterosexuality, andwar andmilitarism and that “these three
institutions, [...] position human subjects in unequal and hierarchical relations of power."
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Sen (1990) explains this in terms of men and women’s “perceived contribution” to
the household, which “tends to relate to the size of the direct money earning rather
than to the amount of time and effort expended (or to the role of non-market activ-
ities by other members of the family, who indirectly support such earnings)." Thus,
even if women spend more or equal time and effort on tasks within the house-
hold, their work is perceived as a smaller contribution to the household than the
paid tasks performed outside the household bymen. If the preference gap between
men and women within the home arises out of roles that have different values, it is
plausible that these preferences too, are valued differently. In particular, women’s
preferences, borne out of their specific role within the household, may be valued
less than the preferences of men.
Participation and Representation
The bulk of literature on how to achieve the substantive representation of women’s
distinctive preferences focuses on top-down mechanisms. Specifically it examines
howwomen’s participation as leadersmay lead to better representation ofwomen’s
preferences8. However scholars have paid less attention to the prospects of bottom-
upmechanisms i.e. whether, and under what conditions, women’s participation as
citizens can improve the substantive representation of their preferences.
Existing evidence on the effects of greater political participation by women, fol-
lowing the extension of suffrage rights in the US andWestern Europe, supports the
notion that increased participation leads to policy shifts in the direction ofwomen’s
collective preferences. Lott and Kenny (1999) find that the extension of suffrage
through the Nineteenth Amendment in the United States led to increases in wel-
fare spending by state governments, and increased the probability of enactment of
8This includes a large body ofwork on the impacts ofwomen’s quotas and the behavior of female
legislators (Tripp and Kang, 2008; Htun, 2016; Wängnerud, 2009; Barnes, 2016; Chattopadhyay and
Duflo, 2004; Clots-Figueras, 2011; Iyer et al., 2012).
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prohibition laws, and amendments to divorce laws that benefitted women. Miller
(2008) documents an increase in health spending and consequent improvements in
children’s health following the extension of suffrage. Aidt and Dallal (2008) find
similar effects inWestern Europe where the extension of suffrage leads to increases
in social spending. Carruthers and Wanamaker (2015) find that the Nineteenth
Amendment led to greater public resources for education, but that these gainswere
concentrated in white schools.
Most women living in new democracies in the developing world have never
faced a legal barrier to political participation, since universal franchise was en-
shrined in their country’s constitution at the time of independence. Universal suf-
frage had become an "irresistible norm" by the second half of the twentieth century
(Przeworski, 2009), which is when most countries in modern day South Asia, in-
cluding Pakistan, gained independence.
Equal participation rights may provide women the opportunity to participate
and signify their preferences, but we will not observe corresponding shifts in pol-
icy if women do not actually exercise these rights in a meaningful way. I argue that
the relationship between women’s de jure right to participate and the de facto repre-
sentation of their preferences depends in part on two factors on the side of women
citizens: 1) their actual levels of participation, and 2) whether such participation is
reflective of their preferences.
Levels of Participation
Following the extension of suffrage, gender gaps in voter turnout still persisted in
the developedworld, although they have now reversed such that women systemat-
ically turn out to vote at higher rates than men in many countries. Lott and Kenny
(1999) find that the representational gains from women’s suffrage grew overtime
as more and more women took advantage of the franchise. The secular trend of
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narrowing gender gaps in voter participation also holds in developing democra-
cies. In an analysis of gender gaps in political participation in 20 African countries,
Isaksson, Kotsadam and Nerman (2014) find that in 6 countries the gender gap is
reversed for voting: women turn out in higher numbers thanmen. In India, Kapoor
and Ravi (2015) document a steady increase in women’s turnout in state level elec-
tions between 1962 and 2012, and also document a closing of the gender gap in
turnout.
However it isworth noting that voting is not the only tool– and is arguably an es-
pecially blunt one– for signifying preferences to representatives. Citizens can also
engage in various forms of inter-electoral participation, including but not limited
to communicating directly with representatives, attending political meetings and
rallies, andmaking campaign contributions. These forms of engagement may have
greater influence on representative behavior than voting (Cleary, 2007). Gender
gaps in such forms of participation still remain substantial and significant across
various contexts. I document similar patterns in Pakistan: the existence of stark
gender gaps in levels of political participation of all forms, and particularly wide
gaps in inter-electoral participation.
Various scholars have tried to understand why these gaps exist and how to
close them. A set of studies shows that the gender gap in individual level factors
that are predictive of political participation (e.g. money, time, civic skills, political
knowledge and efficacy) has explanatory power for the gender gap in participation
(Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; Verba, Burns and Schlozman, 1997). However,
emerging research demonstrates that even when accounting for many of these fac-
tors, women remain less engaged with politics than similarly situated men. For
instance Isaksson, Kotsadam and Nerman (2014) show that norms at the commu-
nity level hold more explanatory power than individual level factors for women’s
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under-participation in countries in sub-Saharan Africa9. In an extreme example,
Gottlieb (2016) finds that a civic education course delivered inMali raises bothmen
and women’s individual levels of political knowledge, but exacerbates the gender
gap in actual political participation since female participants are seen as deviating
from social norms, and either compensate for this by voluntarily reducing partici-
pation, or are prevented by men from participating due to a backlash effect.
Expression of Preferences
If women participate at higher rates, can we reasonably expect this to improve
the representation of their preferences? We observe a positive relationship be-
tween women’s participation and their substantive representation in the context
of Western developed democracies when women exercise their rights under suf-
frage. However, I argue that this does not generalize to contexts where women’s
participation is not reflective of their preferences.
Bleck andMichelitch (2017) examine the case of women’s political participation
in rural Mali, and suggest that such participation is often mobilized (by chiefs or
religious leaders) rather than autonomously initiated by women themselves. High
rates of female voter turnout are hardly a promising pathway for representation
if women are being coerced to turn out. Blaydes and El Tarouty (2009) find that
women were more likely to be targeted for vote-buying in the Egyptian parliamen-
tary election of 2005. Using records of village-levelmeetings in India, Parthasarathy
et al. (2017) find that a female-centered poverty alleviation program, which explic-
itly aims to bring women into greater contact with village government, increases
women’s attendance and likelihood of speaking up at these meetings. Yet they also
9They find that a higher share of men with primary and secondary education is not predictive
of male participation levels but is correlated with women’s levels of participation. They interpret as
this as “Having more people with secondary education is arguably correlated with less traditional
gender norms, even if men are the ones being educated.”
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find that this does not lead to a change in agenda-setting or greater responses to
women by the state representatives present at these meetings.
This group of recent studies points to important constraints on part of external
actors – village chiefs, religious leaders, political party workers and representatives
– which may undermine the relationship between women’s political participation
and the representation of their preferences. In this paper, I identify an internal
constraint: women themselves may be reluctant to express their own distinctive
preferences when provided the opportunity to do so.
1.3 Context: Gender Inequality in Pakistan
The last nine years represent the longest uninterrupted period of civilian demo-
cratic rule in Pakistan’s political history since the country gained independence in
1947. The 2013 general elections marked the first civilian transfer of power from
one democratically elected government to another, and were deemed by local and
international observers to be the freest and fairest elections in the country since
1970. The local body elections held in all four provinces in 2015 marked the first
instance of devolution of power under a democratically elected government. Pak-
istan has made considerable democratic advances in the past few years, however
women have arguably been excluded from these gains.
Although it is one of fifty nine countries to have had a female head of state in
the last five decades, women’s political participation at other levels remains low.
On the side of citizen participation, although universal franchise has existed on
paper in Pakistan since independence in 1947, the right to vote is unevenly exer-
cised. For one, there is a large and persistent voter registration gap between men
and women across all four provinces in Pakistan, with an estimated 11.65 million
eligible women excluded from electoral rolls in 2015. Figure 1.1 shows the distri-
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bution of this gender gap in voter registration across the two most recent rounds
of general elections.
The national level gaps are mirrored at the local level. Figure 1.2 shows the dis-
tribution of the gender gap in voter registration across local electoral constituencies
in Faisalabad (the district where this study is conducted) in the lead-up to the 2015
local elections.10.















The severity of the gender gap in registration led the Free and Fair ElectionsNet-
work in Pakistan to call a “Women Voters Registration Emergency” in the country
in 2015. During the 2013 elections, civil society organizations documentedmultiple
instances where womenwere barred from voting through informal agreements be-
tween political parties andmale village leaders. Copies of handwritten agreements
to this effect, bearing the names of political party candidates, are reproduced in
10Unlike the data for voter registration at the national constituency level, data for local elections is
not publicly available and was obtained in person from Faisalabad Regional Election Commission,
Faisalabad in 2016
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Figure 1.311. Although the examples of explicit bars in the 2013 general elections
mostly come from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan, the
Punjab Commission on the Status of Women recorded instances of similar restric-
tions during local elections held in 2015 in the Punjab Province.
The patterns of under-participation are even starker in inter-electoral forms of
participation. Although there is no administrative data available on these forms
of participation, I measure these gaps through survey questions, and report the
results in Section 1.5.
Deep gender inequalities along socioeconomic dimensions co-exist with polit-
ical inequality in Pakistan. In his seminal article on the phenomenon of missing
women in Asia, Sen (1992) notes that Pakistan has the lowest ratio of women to
men among large countries, which is indicative of lower access to nutrition and
healthcare for women, as well as a systematic preference for sons over daughters.
11Source: Aurat Foundation, a civil rights organization which engaged in election monitoring in
2013
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Figure 1.3: Handwritten Agreements Barring Women from Turning Out in
Constituencies PK-93 and PK-95
The standard indicators of women’s empowerment – property/asset ownership,
education, and outside employment – are also alarmingly low in Pakistan. Further-
more, an important context-specific factor limits women’s opportunities in political
and socioeconomic realms: cultural norms of women’s mobility and seclusion re-
strict women’s ability to travel unaccompanied or without the permission of a male
household member or relative (Jacoby, 2011; Mumtaz and Salway, 2005).
Sen (1992) articulates “participatory political action” by women as a potential way
to improving the situation of women’s relative deprivation in Asian countries. In-
deed, there have been many interventions in Pakistan focused on increasing levels
of political participation by women. During my fieldwork, I documented multiple
instances of such interventions undertaken during the 2008 and 2013 national elec-
tions, including but not limited to voter education campaigns targeted at women
run by the Pakistan Election Commission, door-to-door informational campaigns
funded by the World Bank (Gine and Mansuri, 2011), and the setup of women’s
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registration camps by civil society organizations, in partnership with the National
Database and Registration Authority (NADRA). Most recently, in anticipation of
the 2018 elections, the Pakistan National Assembly has passed a bill which em-
powers the Pakistan Election Commission to declare elections void if female voter
turnout is below a certain threshold:
If the turnout of women voters is less than ten percent of the total votes
polled in a constituency, the Commissionmay presume that the women
voters have been restrained through an agreement from casting their
votes andmaydeclare, polling at one ormore polling stations or election
in the whole constituency, void (Elections Act, 2017)
While improving women’s levels of participation is a worthy goal in and of it-
self, I ask whether such improvement can actually lead to meaningful changes in
women’s representation.
1.4 Data
To study this question, I draw on an original face-to-face survey conducted in 2016
covering 800 households in 16 local administrative units in the district of Faisal-
abad, located in the Punjab province of Pakistan.
The sampling for the surveys was conducted in 2 stages. First, 10 rural union
councils and 6 urbanmunicipal committees (equivalent of union councils for urban
areas) were randomly sampled from among the total of 468 administrative units in
the district. Each union council or municipal committee contains 6 electoral blocks
or wards, 1 block/ward was randomly drawn from each randomly selected union
council for surveying. Appendix A.1 reproduces the relevant section from the Pun-
jab Local Government Act 2013 explaining the delimitation of administrative units.
In the second stage, 50 households were randomly selected in each electoral ward
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to receive a survey, for a total sample of 800 households. The selection rule for
households is described in Appendix A.2.
Half of the households in each ward were randomly selected to have a married
man as the primary respondent while the other half were randomly selected to
have a married woman as the primary respondent. In each household, the spouses
of the primary respondent received a short supplementary survey to record demo-
graphic characteristics and their preferences over a set of public goods and services,
so 1600 individuals were surveyed in total. Surveys were always conducted by an
enumerator of the same sex, in keeping with local norms of private interactions
with non-family members of the opposite sex.
Table 1.1 below shows a summary of demographic and socioeconomic charac-
teristics for the 800 primary respondents in the sample; Table 1.2 shows the means
for the same characteristics among the male and female sample (N=400 each), and
p-values from a t-test of difference in means (or proportion, as appropriate) be-
tween the two samples:
Table 1.1: Summary Characteristics of Primary Respondents
Min Max Mean SD N
Female 0 1 0.5 0.5 800
Married 1 1 1 0 800
Age 18 50 35 7.93 800
Education Level 1 8 3.45 2.17 800
Employed 0 1 0.56 0.49 800
Monthly HH Income (PKR) 3,000 200,000 17,070 16,990 782
Table 1.2: Gender Differences in Summary Characteristics
Mean(M) Mean(F) Diff p-value
Age 36.96 32.83 4.12 0.00
Education Level 3.18 3.09 0.09 0.002
Employed 0.97 0.16 0.81 0.00
Monthly HH Income (PKR) 17,890 16,254 1,637 0.18
Notably, the randomly sampledmarried women in this sample are significantly
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younger, less educated and far less likely to be employed than the randomly sam-
pled married men. This reflects national patterns of gender gaps in age at first
marriage, educational attainment and employment12. Since the question about
monthly income relates to the household, rather than individual earnings, there
is no significant difference in the numbers reported by men and women.
To measure preferences, enumerators asked all 1600 respondents (800 primary











10. Income Support Schemes
11. Transport
12. Security
To guide respondents in the rank ordering process, enumerators used cards
with a pictorial representation of each good/service. The picture cards were shuf-
fled by the enumerator before asking the question, so as to avoid the potential for
12According to the 2012-13 PakistanDemographic andHealth Survey (PDHS), the average age for
first marriage among ever-married women aged 15-49 is 19.5 years, and 24.7 years for ever-married
men in the same group. Thus, when randomly selecting among married respondents, it is likely
that we would select an overall younger sample of women. For this age group in the nationally
representative PDHS sample, 57% of women, and 29% of men have no schooling. The employment
rate recorded for women in the PDHS is 29% for women and 98% for men.
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the presented order of items to affect the ranking in a systematic way. It may seem
intuitive to collapse some of these goods/services by theme for analysis, e.g. trans-
port and roads could be categorized together, as could job and income support
schemes. However, in the Pakistani context, these goods/services have particularly
gendered patterns of use. In terms of transport, men often use personal bicycles or
motorbikes when traveling by road, (72% of households in my sample own either
a bicycle or motorbike), but it is not the norm for women to use bicycles or drive
motorbikes themselves. Thus, women may have a stake in the quality of public
transport even if their household owns a private mode of transport. Collapsing
“roads” and “transport” runs the risk of masking this difference. In most contexts
income and jobs schemes could potentially be collapsed under a general “liveli-
hoods schemes” category. However in the case of Pakistan, the major state-run
cash transfer program (Benazir Income Support Program) is exclusively targeted
at women. Thus, respondents may have perceptions about who is more likely to
benefit from a an income supplementing scheme, which could drive differential
preferences among men and women over this item.
Tomeasure political participation in the survey, enumerators asked direct ques-
tions about voter registration status, voting in the last election (2015 local elections),
political party membership, and attendance at rallies and community meetings in
the past year. Enumerators also asked respondents direct questions about their
communication with the following levels of political representatives:
1. Political party worker
2. Union Council Chairman (Local Government, directly elected in 2015)
3. Female Councillor (Local Government, indirectly elected)13
13At the time of this survey, the new local level female councillors had not been appointed in the
Punjab province, despite direct local level elections having taken place nearly a year prior. Given
this, there was confusion over how the survey questions related to the female councillor was inter-
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4. Member of Provincial Assembly (Provincial Government, directly elected in
2013)
5. Member ofNationalAssembly (NationalGovernment, directly elected in 2013)
Since communicationwith representatives is often driven by a specific need on part
of an individual, respondents were also asked about their ability to access these
various levels of political representatives, should a need to communicate arise.
Behavioral Measure of Preference Expression
A goal of the survey is to understand whether men and women express their own
preferences when they have an equal opportunity to participate. Since the study
is conducted in an inter-electoral period, I focus on an inter-electoral form of par-
ticipation: communication with a local-level representative. I deploy a behavioral
measurement strategy to capture gender gaps in such communication among sur-
vey respondents, when the cost of communication is either zero, or artificially equal-
ized across male and female respondents. The measurement strategy proceeds as
follows:
All primary respondents are compensated Rs.200($2) for their participation in
the survey and then read the following text at the end of the survey:
Once we have collected the views of a number of households in your
area, we will pass on this information to your union council chairman.
We will not tell him/her which households we surveyed or what any
one individual said, just what most people in the area think. However,
we can only take one set of preferences from each household: yours or
your spouse’s. Your union councilorwill not knowwhether your house-
hold gave yours or your spouse’s preferences. It is your choice whether
we communicate your preferences or your spouse’s preferences. Which
would you like us to communicate?
preted (e.g. some respondents understood it to mean the former female councillor) Therefore I do
not report results for this level of representative
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The measure is designed so as to explicitly rule out particular mechanisms that
could drive the choice of whose preferences to communicate. First, various costs
associated with communication (time, distance, effort) are absorbed by the survey
team, therefore insofar as these costs are unequally distributed across men and
women, they are equalized to zero in the context of this measurement strategy.
Second, men and women in the same household are interviewed separately,
in private, and by an enumerator of the same gender as them. This measurement
exercise is only conductedwith the primary respondent in a household. Therefore,
barring the primary respondent willingly disclosing their choice to their spouse,
the choice is private and anonymous. This rules out the possibility that respondents
would act out of expectations of their spouse’s reaction to their choice.
Third, the respondents are also assured of the anonymity of the preferences they
choose to communicate. They are told that their representative will be provided
information about constituent preferences in aggregate form, and will not know
which individuals’ preferences are contained in the aggregate numbers. This ac-
counts for concerns that respondents would make their choice based on whether
they think their local representative is more/less likely to respond to preferences
based on the gender, or other identifiable characteristics of the individual who is
communicating with them. This is likely to be a more salient constraint for women
who, as anecdotal evidence reveals, are in fact devalued as informants about public
goods and services by representatives.
Finally themeasure forces equal levels communication of preferences.The choice
available to the respondent is whether to communicate their own preferences or
their spouses’. What this measure then captures is men and women’s willingness
to assert their own preferences, when the nominal level of participation is held
equal.
In addition, I also measure the sensitivity of the respondent’s choice to a mon-
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etary cost. Respondents are assigned to one of three conditions:
• Control: It is your choice whether we communicate your preferences or your
spouse’s preferences.
• T1: It is your choicewhetherwe communicate your preferences or your spouse’s
preferences. However, if you want us to communicate your own, it will cost
Rs.50 from the Rs.200 that we gave you earlier. If you want to communicate
your spouse’s we will do that for no cost.
• T2: It is your choicewhetherwe communicate your preferences or your spouse’s
preferences. However, if you want us to communicate your spouse’s, it will
cost Rs.50 from the Rs.200 that we gave you earlier. If you want to communi-
cate your own we will do that for no cost.
These cost treatments are intended to measure how malleable the patterns of pref-
erence expression are among men and women, and whether they are responsive
to monetary incentives. Treatment 1 reflects an extreme scenario where commu-
nicating one’s own preferences is more costly than communicating someone else’s
(in this case one’s spouse’s) preferences. Treatment 2 reflects the more “realistic”
conditionwhere communicating someone’s else’s (in this case one’s spouse’s) pref-
erences is relatively costly: ostensibly it is more costly to communicate someone
else’s preferences over one’s own, as it involves the time and effort of getting to
know (or even guessing) those preferences.
1.5 Results
Gender Gaps in Preferences (Survey Measure)
Domen andwomen have different preferences over public good service provision?
Previous work has found evidence of aggregate gender gaps in such preferences
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in the developing world (Olken, 2010; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Gottlieb,
Grossman and Robinson, 2016). However, these studies have not tested whether
these gendered preference gaps also exist within the same household. The “ho-
mophily principle”(McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001) suggests that simi-
larity on various demographic, socioeconomic, attitudinal and behavioral charac-
teristics structures people’s social network ties (including marriage). If we think
that men and women may select into marriage based on similar preferences, or
other characteristics that shape these preferences, we may see that the preference
differences that exist between men and women in the aggregate are smaller, or
non-existent within married couples. On the other hand, if it is conditions within
the household – specifically the division of roles and labor within the household
– that shape these preferences, then we should see the aggregate level differences
reflected within the household.
To test whether there is indeed preference heterogeneity within the household,
I pool the data on rankings of public goods and services from 800 primary respon-
dents and their spouses (N=1600) and estimate a series of 12 seemingly unrelated
OLS regressions (SUR) where the dependent variable in each model is the the rank
given to 1 of 12 goods or services by a respondent in a household14. The right hand
side variables include a dummy variable indicating whether respondent is a fe-
male, and household fixed effects. The addition of household fixed effects means
that the coefficient on the female dummy variable captures the within-household
effect of being female on the rank given to a particular good. Figure 1.4 below plots
the estimated coefficients on the female dummy variable from the 12 models. Note
that a lower rankmeans a higher priority; ranking something as number onemeans
that the respondent prefers it the most among the set of goods. Thus, negative co-
14I follow the approach in Gottlieb, Grossman and Robinson (2016) of using the SUR setup to
allow for correlation of errors across the equations, which I expect will exist since the rank given to
any one good/service depends on the rank given to the others
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efficients imply that women are more likely to prefer a particular good.







































The results are in line with the patterns of aggregate gender differences from stud-
ies in Indonesia, India and sub-Saharan Africa. Women give significantly lower
ranks to (have a greater preference for) healthcare, drinkingwater, and income gen-
eration schemes, and higher ranks (have a lower preference) for roads and transport
than the men in the same household. This analysis provides the first empirical test
demonstrating that previously documented aggregate level differences also exist
within the household.
Previous studies have suggested that the household division of labor shapes
gender gaps in preferences. Women in these study contexts are responsible for wa-
ter collection and likely to benefit disproportionately from its provision. On the
other hand, men are more likely to travel by road for work, and likely to benefit
disproportionately from infrastructure improvement. In a separate piece (Khan,
2017b), I explore why the specific mechanisms driving women’s relatively higher
preference for water is different in the context of this particular district in Pakistan.
Here, many households in the survey sample receive a piped water supply, and
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gendered norms of mobility dictate that it is actually more often men who col-
lect water when it is required. Interviews with community organizers suggest that
women’s relative preference for drinkingwater arises out of a concern for children’s
waterborne illnesses, which are ubiquitous, and a leading cause of child mortality
in this context. Women’s relative support for income generation schemes, may be
driven by a higher preference for redistribution which also exists in other contexts
Brule and Gaikwad (2017). However, in the case of Pakistan, the major state-run
cash-transfer program (Benazir Income Support Program) is targeted at women,
therefore the preference in this case could potentially be driven by women seeing
themselves as the likely beneficiaries of an income supplementing scheme. Simi-
larly, women’s lower preference for roads may be related, as in other contexts, to
the fact that women are less likely to travel by road for work than are men due to
differential labor force participation rates. However, the added context-specific re-
strictions on women’s mobility mean that women in this context are less likely to
travel by road than men, not just for work, but for any reason at all (Jacoby, 2011;
Mumtaz and Salway, 2005).
The householddivision of labormay exist across contexts as a “shaping force”(Beckwith,
2014) or an “institution”(Htun, 2005) that informs men and women’s lived experi-
ences and preferences, but it also interacts with other contextual factors. An ob-
servationally equivalent difference in preferences across contexts may in fact be
driven by different facets of the context-specific household division of labor, and
its interaction with local norms.
Gender Gaps in Levels of Participation (Survey Measures)
Having established that men and women have systematically different preferences
and priorities, I now turn to the question of whether they participate at different
rates in the political sphere. Table 1.3 shows the proportion of male and female
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respondents responding "yes" to various self-reported measures of electoral and
inter-electoral participation. Column 3 shows the gender difference in proportions,
and Column 4 shows the p-value from a two-sample t-test of difference in propor-
tions.
Table 1.3: Gender Gaps in Electoral and Inter-electoral Participation in Survey
Sample
Measure Prop(M) Prop(F) Diff p-value
Electoral and Inter-Electoral Participation
Registered to Voted 0.95 0.72 0.22 0.00
Voted in 2015 0.89 0.67 0.22 0.00
Attended rally (Past Year) 0.19 0.04 0.14 0.00
Attended community meeting (Past Year) 0.30 0.06 0.24 0.00
Member of political party 0.16 0.10 0.06 0.02
Contact with Representatives in Last Year
Contacted Party Worker 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.70
Contacted UC Chair 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.00
Contacted MPA 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00
Contacted MNA 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00
Access to Representatives
Can access Party Worker 0.67 0.44 0.23 0.00
Can access UC Chair 0.80 0.60 0.20 0.00
Can access MPA 0.43 0.21 0.22 0.00
Can access MNA 0.39 0.20 0.20 0.00
Notably, there is a substantially large and statistically significant gap across all
measures. The usual caveats about self-reported turnout apply to the proportions
who report voting in the 2015 local election, but the gap between men and women
in this measure is still meaningful. Contact and communication with one’s repre-
sentatives is an important tool for accountability. In particular, one of the rationales
for decentralization is its potential to allows increased access to a lower level of
representative. Respondents in the survey do in fact report higher levels of access
to their local union council chairman than to their provincial or national repre-
sentative. However, despite a majority respondents knowing their union council
chairperson either directly or indirectly, a very small proportion report having ap-
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proached him/her in the past year to “get something done” or “solve a problem.”
Moreover, the gender gaps in such contact are substantial.
Starker still are the gender gaps in access to representatives. The question about
access was phrased liberally to ask about whether the respondent could access rep-
resentative either personally, or through someone in their household. Given that it
was random as to whether a household had a primary female or male respondent,
we should not expect systematic differences in access at the household level. The
lower reports of access bywomen respondents suggest that not only arewomen less
likely to have direct access to representatives, they may not even have knowledge
of the indirect access they potentially enjoy through other household members 15.
If systematically fewer women are contacting and communicating with their
representatives, it implies that their voices and opinions are likely to be absent
from decision-making. In the Pakistani rural context, communication is also some-
times initiated by representatives themselves in the form of informal town-halls
held prior to elections, (these are the “community meetings” referred to in 1.3),
but women are dismally absent from such processes. This exclusion partly reflects
a perception that women are less likely to be informed about services and com-
munity needs; a former councillor stated in an an interview “Women are usually
inside so they know less about these things" 16. However, women’s opinions may
be discounted, even with regards to the realms of planning in which their inte-
rior positionality in the household provides them with specialized knowledge. In
another interviewwith a male civil society organizer whose organization conducts
trainings for newly inducted local councillors, the interviewee stated: “When I built
my house, I didn’t ask my wife where to put the fan in the kitchen. If I had asked
15An alternative interpretation is that men are greatly overstating access to signal higher status
and connectedness to an enumerator. However if we take this seriously, more men ought to be
saying they are connected to higher levels of representatives, which does not bear out in the data
16Author Interview, 2016
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her I would have known not to put it where I did. This is the state of women’s
representation in local planning”17.
The absence of women’s voices in the political sphere is a serious problem, but
these anecdotes point to a different obstacle: women’s voices may not be taken seri-
ously by representatives evenwhen they are present. This is in linewith the pattern
documented in a recent study by Parthasarathy et al. (2017), who find that despite
increased participation by women in village councils in India, there are no impacts
on agenda setting or responsiveness from the representatives present at council
meetings. Importantly, it is unreasonable to expect that women are unaware of this
dismissal of their voices. Rather, this may negatively influence their willingness to
participate at all, and their expectations of the gains from doing so. A thorough
exploration of constraints to representation on part of external actors (specifically
representatives) is outside the scope of this paper. In the next section, I turn to an-
other constraint which may limit the gains from women’s participation: women’s
own reticence to assert their distinctive preferences when they participate.
Gender Gaps in Preference Expression (Behavioral Measure)
Primary respondents in the survey sample are asked to rank a set of public goods
and services and then asked to choose whether they would like their own, or their
spouse’s preferences to be communicated to their local representative. Given the
low baseline levels of communication between respondents and their representa-
tives reported in the survey, this is a unique opportunity. Respondents are assured
that their choice is private and anonymous. Communication of some sort is guar-
anteed in this exercise: a set of preferences will be communicated, it is simply up to
the respondent to choose whose preferences ought to be communicated. Figure 1.5
shows the proportion of respondents that choose to communicate their own pref-
17Author Interview, 2016
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erences across each of the 3 cost conditions. The control represents the condition
where there is no cost, T1 represents the condition where communicating one’s
own preferences is relatively costly (it involves giving up 25% of the survey sitting
fee), T2 represents the condition where communicating one’s spouse’s preferences
is relatively costly (it involves giving up 25% of the survey sitting fee).
Figure 1.5: Proportion of Respondents Choosing to Communicate Own










































The stark gender gap in the control condition is the core finding of this paper.
In this condition, most men choose to communicate their own preferences, and the
trend is exactly reversed for women, most of whom choose to communicate their
spouse’s preferences. This is consistentwithmultiple explanations that could drive
individuals’ choice under conditions of privacy and anonymity. Greater altruism
or other-regarding preferences on part of women may make them more likely to
forego the opportunity to communicate their own preferences, in favor of commu-
nicating someone else’s (in this case their spouse’s). In their review of existing evi-
dence on gender differences in altruism Croson and Gneezy (2009) determine that
the evidence on other-regarding preferences is inconclusive; what emerges instead
is that women aremore sensitive to the social context of experiments thanmen. It is
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difficult to parse this out within the context of a single study where the experimen-
tal context is not varied. The results may also reflect a gendered difference in the
preference for exercising agency. In a lab experimental setting in Pakistan, Afzal
et al. (2016) find that women subjects are less willing to forego a material payoff
to guarantee their own choice in the context of a low-stakes consumption choice.
They interpret this as a “lowdemand for agency" on part ofwomen, stemming from
them having internalized a subordinate position within the household. Finally, as
I will argue, women’s unwillingness to communicate their own preferences could
reflect a lower value placed on the preferences themselves
Women and men also respond differently to the cost treatments. In the case of
Treatment 1, where it is relatively costly to communicate one’s own preferences,
the gender gap is no longer significant. Less than a quarter of all respondents are
willing to give up Rs.50 to communicate their own preferences over their spouses.
In Treatment 2, where it is relatively costly to communicate one’s spouse’s pref-
erences, the gender gap remains. Hardly any men are willing to give up Rs.50 to
communicate their spouse’s preferences in place of their own, but nearly 20% of
women are willing to do so.
I estimate the following model (with ward fixed effects) to capture the gender
differences in choice, and the differential sensitivity of this choice to the two cost
treatments. Figure 1.6 displays the conditional coefficients on Treatment 1 and 2 by
gender, and Table 1.4, columns 1 and 2 show the corresponding regression results:
Choicei,j = α + β1Femalei + β2T1i + β3T2i + β4(Female*T1)i + β5(Female*T2)i
+β6Wardj + 
The coefficient on T1 is significantly smaller for women than it is formen. There are
multiple possible interpretations for this differential sensitivity to the treatment.
First, the effect of an additional cost on communicating one’s own preferences may
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be smaller for women due to floor effects – so few women choose to communicate
their own preferences to begin with, that the added cost does not have the poten-
tial to change their overall behavior by very much. On the other hand, men are
highly sensitive to the treatment, and most are willing to give up the opportunity
to communicate their own preferences in favor of their spouses when it is costly
to do so. Given that costs of communication for men in the real world (in terms
of mobility and access to representatives) might be lower than those for women,
their behavior in response to this treatment suggests that they could potentially be
incentivized to communicate women’s preferences to representatives. This is re-
flective of how women actually access representatives indirectly in the everyday.
In the survey I also ask men and women about who they would approach if faced
with various problems related to local public good and service provision. For in-
stance, I ask respondents about who they would approach if if there was no female
doctor at their local Basic Healthcare Unit (BHU). 44% of men say they would di-
rectly approach their local councillor, and only 13% say they would first approach
their spouse. Meanwhile only 15% of women say they would directly approach
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their local councillor, and 38% say they would first approach their spouse. This is
especially striking given that the problem in question, that of a female doctor, is
ostensibly one that disproportionately affects women.
On the other hand, the coefficient on T2 is significantly larger for women than
it is for men. Again, this may reflect a ceiling effect for men: so few men choose
to communicate their spouse’s preferences to begin with, that an additional cost to
doing so cannot discourage a much larger proportion from doing so. In the case
of women, on the one hand the jump in the proportion willing to communicate
their own preferences in response to the cost treatment is striking. Equally striking
though is that a significant proportion of women (nearly 20%) are willing to give
up Rs.50 to assert their spouse’s preferences in place of their own.
One way to interpret the relative sensitivities to the treatments is by thinking of
the population of survey respondents as comprised of 3 types of individuals: those
who will always assert their own preferences over their own spouses regardless of
cost, those who will do so only when incentivized, and those who will never do so.
The gender gaps are indicative that there is a significantly higher proportion of the
first type (those who always assert) among men, and of the third type (those who
never assert) among women.
In addition, I pool the two cost treatments and test whether the gender gap
persists when there is any cost imposed on communication, regardless of whether
the cost is attached to communicating one’s own or one’s spouse’s preferences. I
find that women are significantly less likely to communicate their own preferences.
Figure 1.7 shows the difference in means across men and women choosing to com-
municate their own preferences in the control and in the pooled cost treatment con-
ditions, and the results from regressionmodels pooling the two cost treatments are
shown in Table 1.4, columns 3 and 4.
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Figure 1.7: Proportion of Respondents Choosing to Communicate Own









































What makes men and women more or less likely to assert their preferences? In
this section I analyze how the choice to assert one’s own preferences is shaped by
various factors.
Preference Differences
If individuals behave in a self-interested way, they ought to be particularly con-
cerned about asserting their own preferences when these preferences are substan-
tially different from the alternative (in this case, the spouse’s preferences). To test
this, I look at whether the choice made by respondents is sensitive to how different
they think their own preferences are from their spouse’s preferences. I measure this
perception using a 4 point scale (0: No difference to 4: Completely Different). I also
measure the actual difference in preferences using a Euclidean distance measure of
difference in ranks accorded to different public goods and services by respondents
and their spouses. I then estimate the following model:
43
Table 1.4: Effect of Cost Treatments on Choice to Communicate Own Preferences,
OLS Models
Dependent variable:
Choose to Communicate Own Preferences=1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female −0.296∗∗∗ −0.640∗∗∗ −0.297∗∗∗ −0.640∗∗∗













Constant 0.627∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.056) (0.073) (0.075)
Ward FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 800 800 800 800
R2 0.479 0.538 0.106 0.165
Adjusted R2 0.467 0.526 0.087 0.146
Residual Std. Error 0.365 (df = 781) 0.344 (df = 779) 0.477 (df = 782) 0.462 (df = 781)
F Statistic 39.816∗∗∗ (df = 18; 781) 45.367∗∗∗ (df = 20; 779) 5.462∗∗∗ (df = 17; 782) 8.575∗∗∗ (df = 18; 781)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Choicei,j = α + β1Femalei + β2T1i + β3T2i + β4PerceivedDiffi + β5ActualDiffi
+ β6(Female*PerceivedDiff)i + β7(Female*ActualDiff)i + β8Wardj + 
Figure 1.8 displays the conditional coefficients on gender, by perceived and ac-
tual differences in preferences. Counter to a logic of self interest, women’s willing-
ness to communicate their own preferences in fact decreases in how different they
perceive their preferences as being, and in how different they actually are. Table
1.5 reports the corresponding regression results:
This finding has grave implications for the prospects of women’s representation. A
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Figure 1.8: Estimated Effect of Gender on Choice to Communicate Own
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difference in men and women’s willingness to assert their own preferences would
not have distributional consequences if theywere communicating the same content
at the end of the day. However, this pattern suggests that women are least willing
to make their preferences known to representatives when it matters the most, i.e.
when they are substantively different.
Explanations of an overall "low demand for agency” (Afzal et al., 2016) cannot
explainwhywomenwould be especially unwilling to assert their preferenceswhen
they see those preferences as distinct. This pattern is more consistent with women
systematically undervaluing the content of their preferences.
The pattern is also consistent with a logic of what constitutes “appropriate”
behavior for women. For instance, it may be “appropriate” for women to speak
up within the household, only as long as it is to voice agreement. In my survey, I
ask respondents whether they would feel comfortable expressing their preference
about a political candidate if their preferences from different from other members
of the household. 78% of men say yes, while only 53% of women do. These results
imply that women’s unwillingness to express a dissenting view on political issues
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within the household potentially extends to environments outside the household.
Women are reticent to express a dissenting view from their spouse evenwhen their
choice to do so is completely confidential, and the audience for their preferences is
not other household members, but rather a political representative.
Table 1.5: Effect of Actual and Perceived Preference Differences on Choice to
Communicate Own Preferences, OLS Models
Dependent variable:
Choose to Communicate Own Preferences=1
(1) (2) (3)
Female −0.174∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗ −0.052
(0.049) (0.082) (0.092)
Perceived Diff. 0.039 0.035
(0.032) (0.032)






Constant 0.591∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.073) (0.076)
Ward FE? Yes Yes Yes
Cost Treatment 1? Yes Yes Yes
Cost Treatment 2? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 800 800 800
R2 0.485 0.482 0.488
Adjusted R2 0.471 0.469 0.473
Residual Std. Error 0.363 (df = 779) 0.364 (df = 779) 0.363 (df = 777)
F Statistic 36.639∗∗∗ (df = 20; 779) 36.217∗∗∗ (df = 20; 779) 33.616∗∗∗ (df = 22; 777)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Empowerment Within the Household
If women’s lower willingness to assert their preferences is borne out of a subordi-
nate position in the household, then greater empowerment within the household
should be related to greater willingness to assert preferences. This may of course,
also hold true for men. To the extent, that their greater willingness to assert pref-
erences is borne out of a superior position within the household, we may expect
that factors that predict such empowerment make men all the more likely to assert
their own preferences. For this analysis, I split the sample into men and women
and analyze howwithin-household empowerment affects their choice of preference
expression. To measure within-household empowerment, I construct an index of
variables that are generally deemed to be predictive or reflective of empowerment.
Spousal Age Difference
Early marriage and spousal age difference has been shown to be predictive, es-
pecially in the South Asian context, of poorer health outcomes for women, and a
greater risk for intimate partner violence (Kishor andGupta, 2009). As such, a large
age difference, where the the woman is younger than her spouse may be reflective
of a power differential within the household favoring the man.
Spousal Education Difference
Education in its own right may influence the value women place on their own
preferences. Anecdotal information suggests that external actors devalue women’s
preferences because they see women as less informed about matters outside the
home. This is not entirely false: women do report watching less political news, and
reading the newspaper less often. Women may devalue their own preferences be-
cause they see themselves as less informed. However, a woman’s individual level
of education may be less important for her status within the household than her
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education relative to her spouse. A woman with a certain level of education may
still defer to her spouse if he is more educated than her. While I control for in-
dividual education in analysis, I only include spousal education difference in the
empowerment index.
Employment Outside the Home
There are significant differences in the levels of employment amongmen andwomen
in the sample (see Table 1.2). However, even among women who work, many work
within the home, while nearly all employed men who work outside the home. Sen
(1992) describes various channels through which employment outside the home
can affect women’s status within the home:
First, outside employment for wages can provide women with an in-
come to which they have easier access, and it can also serve as a means
of making a living on which women can rely, making them less vulner-
able. Second, the social respect that is associated with being a “bread
winner" (and a “productive” contributor to the family’s joint prosperity)
can improve women’s status and standing in the family, and may influ-
ence the prevailing cultural traditions regarding who gets what in the
division of joint benefits. Third, when outside employment takes the
form of jobs with some security and legal protection, the correspond-
ing rights that women get can make their economic position much less
vulnerable and precarious. Fourth, working outside the home also pro-
vides experience of the outsideworld, and this can be socially important
in improving women’s position within the family. In this respect out-
side work may be “educational" as well.
Decision-making Power
Many scholars emphasize the element of agency and the ability to make strategic
decisions as a key part of empowerment (Kabeer, 1999). As part of the survey, I
measure whether men and women are either the primary or joint decision-makers
over a set of household decisions relating to everyday household purchases, ma-
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jor household purchases and decisions about seeking healthcare (whether to see a
doctor, and which doctor to see).
The index is a weighted average of each of these variables. I use the inverse
covariance weighting method which optimizes information content from variables
that are considered to be related a priori by up-weighting variables that provide
“new” information (Anderson, 2008). Figure 1.9 showshow this index is distributed
among male and female respondents. Unsurprisingly, men are, on average, far
more “empowered” than women.
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I also test whether individuals’ communication choices are related to gender equi-
table attitudes. To measure this, I include a predictor of gender equitable attitudes
on an ostensibly unrelated topic: whether respondents think household chores are
solely a woman’s responsibility. The responses are coded on a 4 point scale (0:
Completely Agree to 4: Completely Disagree) where a higher number indicates a
more equitable attitude. I expect that respondents with more gender equitable at-
titudes towards women may be more likely to communicate women’s preferences
(for men, this means their spouse’s preferences, for women this means their own
preferences).
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Table 1.6 shows results from the following model, run separately for men and
women. All variables are standardized for ease of interpretation.
Choicei,j = α + β1Agei + β2Educationi + β3HH Empowermenti
+ β4Equitable Attitudei + β5Perceived Diff.i + β6Actual Diff.i
+ β7T1i + β8T2i + β9Wardj + 
Household empowerment is positively related with women’s willingness to assert
their own preferences. Importantly, education levels and age at the individual level
do not predict women’s choices. There is something about the relative position
in the household that is key for women’s preference expression. The gains from
household empowerment for women are similar in size to the negative effect of
perceived difference of preferences. These results suggest both that an inferior sta-
tus within the householdmay constrainwomen’s assertion of their preferences and
that household empowerment may indeed be a promising pathway for women’s
preference assertion, However, there is no similar relationship for men. One ex-
planation for this is that the index is constructed of factors generally thought to
predict women’s household empowerment. It is possible that men’s position within
the household, and their preference assertion, is determined by other factors not
captured by this index. Another possibility is ceiling effects: men are simply far
more likely to communicate their preferences on average, and there is lower vari-
ation in their levels of empowerment as measured by this index. However, men’s
willingness to communicate their own preferences over their spouses is decreasing
in gender equitable attitudes: menwho believe that women are not solely responsi-
ble for household chores aremore likely to communicate their spouse’s preferences
in this behavioral measure. This is consistent with men valuing women’s prefer-
ences over public goods and services more if they do not think of women’s role in
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Table 1.6: Effect of Household Empowerment on Choice to Communicate Own
Preferences, OLS Models
Dependent variable:






HH Empowerment 0.021 0.057∗∗
(0.022) (0.028)
Equitable Attitude −0.030∗ 0.014
(0.015) (0.022)
Perceived Diff. 0.019 −0.056∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.020)




Settlement FE? Yes Yes
Cost Treatment1? Yes Yes
Cost Treatment2? Yes Yes
Observations 400 400
R2 0.579 0.490
Adjusted R2 0.553 0.459
Residual Std. Error (df = 376) 0.313 0.357
F Statistic (df = 23; 376) 22.444∗∗∗ 15.730∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
the household as confined to housework.
1.7 Discussion
There are well-documented gender inequalities in levels of political participation
around the world. These gaps are particularly stark in Pakistan, where women are
missing from electoral rolls in large numbers, face informal bans from turning out
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to vote, report negligible levels of contact with their representatives, and enjoy at
best low levels of indirect access to local levels of government. In this paper, I first
show that the exclusion of women’s voices from the political sphere has potential
material and distributive consequences. Women hold systematically different pref-
erences over what goods and services they want to see provided in their commu-
nities. These preferences are rooted in a gendered division of labor which implies
that certain goods and services – such as drinking water – provide them dispro-
portionate benefits. The heterogeneity of preferences between men and women is
observable within households.
Past and planned interventions by external actors working for democracy pro-
motion, andpolicymeasures undertaken by the Pakistani state are directed towards
improving the level of women’s participation and bringing it on par with that of
men. While achieving equality in political participation among men and women
is a worthy goal, I argue that it is not sufficient to guarantee the representation of
women’s preferences in the political sphere. Even when they engage in acts of par-
ticipation, women may be held back from asserting their own preferences. Using a
behavioralmeasure of participation I show thatwhenmen andwomen are given an
equal opportunity to communicate their demands to their representative, they use
this opportunity in markedly different ways. Men use it to assert their own prefer-
ences, while women use it to forward the preferences of their spouses. Moreover,
women are especially unwilling to assert their own preferences when they perceive
these preferences as being distinctive from their spouse, which is consistent with a
logic of systematic undervaluation of their preferences.
Ultimately, this finding challenges the theoretical relationship betweenwomen’s
political participation and the substantive representation of their preferences and
interests. Evidence from Western industrialized democracies shows that policies
shift in the direction of women’s preferences when women are extended the right
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to participate in politics. My results demonstrate that this is unlikely to be true in
contexts where extreme gender inequality at the level of the household precludes
women from expressing distinctive preferences within the household, and from
using their legal rights to act on their distinctive preferences outside of it.
The purpose of highlighting the limited representational gains from women’s
participation is by no means to undermine the importance of equal rights to politi-
cal participation. Rather it is to draw attention to the deep implications of inequal-
ity in the household, a sphere which is often overlooked in mainstream theories of
democratic politics. Okin (1989) notes this oversight within contemporary politi-
cal philosophy and 20th century theories of justice: the question of how "disparity
within the family" shapes prospects for social and political equality more broadly
has received little attention. This paper attempts to correct for that oversight. The
findings demonstrate that, especially in the case of women, the household serves
as an important mediator between citizens and the state, and that ignoring it, ei-
ther in analysis, or in the design of policy, runs the risk of doing the subjects of the
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Abstract
Pakistan has one of the largest gender gaps in turnout among electoral democracies
around theworld. Awidely tested strategy to encourage turnout in a variety of con-
texts is door-to-door voter canvassing or mobilization. We use a field experiment
conducted with 2500 households in the city of Lahore to study the effectiveness of
this strategy in increasing women’s turnout in the 2018 Pakistan General Election.
We find that non-partisan mobilization only improves women’s turnout when mo-
bilizers target men in households, and that targeting women alone is insufficient
to effect changes in women’s political participation on Election Day. Using a costly
behavioral measure of support for women’s role in democracy, we find that tar-
geting men with the mobilization treatment increases their expressed support for
women’s role in democracy beyond Election Day. Results from a post-election sur-
vey suggest that households where both men and women received the treatment
saw greater political discussion among men and women, and that men provided
women in these households with logistical support to vote on Election Day. These
findings have theoretical implications for understanding women’s political partic-
ipation in a context where they enjoy limited agency within the household, and
practical implications for designing effective interventions to improve their partic-
ipation under such conditions.
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2.1 Introduction
Although women enjoy the de jure right to vote and participate in politics around
the world, de facto inequalities in political participation between men and women
persist in many democratic polities. Closing the gender gap in political partici-
pation is not just normatively desirable, it also has potential consequences for the
distribution of resources and content of policy. Existing empirical evidence shows
that across a variety of contexts women hold systematically different preferences
from men over welfare policy, and what public goods and services they want to
see provided in their communities (Brule and Gaikwad, 2017; Chattopadhyay and
Duflo, 2004; Olken, 2010; Gottlieb, Grossman and Robinson, 2016; Inglehart and
Norris, 2000; Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006; Khan, 2017a). Evidence from the US
andWestern Europe following the extension of suffrage suggests thatwhenwomen
participate in higher numbers as voters, policy shifts in line with their distinctive
preferences follow suit (Carruthers and Wanamaker, 2015; Lott and Kenny, 1999;
Miller, 2008). The flip side of this is that if women systematically under partici-
pate, their preferences risk going unheard and unrepresented. This is a particu-
larly salient concern in Pakistan: among the countries surveyed in the most recent
wave of the World Values Survey, Pakistan has the largest gender gap (19.5%) in
self-reported voter turnout.
In this study, we investigate how to close the gender gap in political partici-
pation in a “difficult” setting, and how to increase participation among a group
(women) that has a history of low participation. The setting is one where there is a
gender gap in baseline levels of partisan mobilization and women are overwhelm-
ingly excluded from political networks. In a focus group in one of our study con-
stituencies, a participant stated: "no one talks towomenwhen it comes to asking for
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votes, all the talk is formen2."We explorewhether it is possible to improvewomen’s
participation without changing the structure of political networks, or radically al-
tering the incentives and resources of parties to target women at greater rates.
We use a field experiment conducted across 2500 households in 500 wards (lo-
cal administrative unit) in the city of Lahore in partnership with civic mobilizers to
studywhether a non-partisanmobilization campaign can boostwomen’s participa-
tion in the 2018 General Elections in Pakistan. Themobilization visits are randomly
targeted to either exclusively women (T1), exclusively men (T2), or both women
and men (T3) in treatment households allowing us to explore whether targeting
the mobilization at men within households (who enjoy greater decision-making
power, andmay be involved in the decision of whether women participate) can im-
prove women’s participation in these households. We look at outcomes of voter
turnout among members of our study households, visually verified by enumera-
tors in the days immediately following the General Election using the indelible ink
marks placed on voters’ thumbs. We find no effects of the mobilization campaign
on men’s turnout. The campaign also does not appear to affect women’s turnout
in households where it is targeted only at women. We find weakly positive effects
of the intervention on women’s turnout at the household level, when it is targeted
at only men. We see positive and significant effects of the campaign on the turnout
of women at the individual and household level when the campaign is targeted to
both men and women in a household. The household level effects are robust to
corrections for attrition.
Results from an endline survey administered roughly two months after the
General Election show no evidence that the mobilization campaign had lasting ef-
fects on women’s political knowledge, interest in politics or sense of political self-
efficacy. Neither did it result in a change in the perceived descriptive norms around
2FGD 10, Lahore 01/24/2018
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women’s political participation. We do however find strong evidence that in house-
holds where the mobilization was targeted at both men and women (T3), men and
women were significantly more likely to report discussing politics with each other.
Furthermore, both men and women in these household reported that men pro-
vided logistical support to women on Election Day so that they could vote.
The positive effect on men’s behavior lasts beyond the election. Two months
after the Election, as part of the endline survey, we offer men in our sample house-
holds the option to post a sticker on the entry-way to their residence. Male re-
spondents are randomized into receiving a sticker with a pro-democracy slogan,
or a sticker with a pro-democracy slogan along with a slogan endorsing women’s
essential role in a strong democracy. Men in the control group are 5 percentage
points less likely to accept a sticker endorsing women’s political participation com-
pared to a general pro-democracy sticker, but this differential is fully alleviated for
men in the households where both men and women were mobilized prior to the
election.
These findings contribute to a broader research agenda on the effectiveness of
different strategies and appeals to boost political participation, and on what mo-
tivates individuals to vote. While much of our knowledge on this subject comes
from studies conducted around US elections, we ask these questions in a still-
consolidating developing democracy with higher levels of gender inequality on
various dimensions. The particular context has meaningful implications both for
i) what types of strategies we can reasonably test, e.g. using written materials for
voter education/motivation has less potential in a settingwith a large illiterate pop-
ulation, and ii) what types of strategies we expect to be effective e.g. a stark finding
from the US is that social pressure is particularly effective in increasing turnout
(Gerber, Green and Larimer, 2008; Rogers, Goldstein and Fox, Forthcoming), how-
ever it is unclear that “being seen as a voter” by others would be effective in moti-
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vating women to turnout in a context where visible participation in public space is
not the norm and may in fact risk stigmatization.
2.2 Background & Context
Relevant Literature
The question of how to close the gender gap in political participation is of course
tied to what constrains women’s participation in the first place. One set of expla-
nations focuses on the importance of resources, broadly conceived, in explaining
individuals’ participation (Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995). People need certain
resources (time, money, information, skills) to participate in politics and insofar as
these resources are unequally distributed acrossmen andwomen, theymay explain
the observed gender gaps in participation. There is some evidence that targeting
such resource constraints can be effective in increasing women’s participation. For
instance, surveys across various contexts find a substantive gender gap in political
knowledge. Can the provision of this political knowledge increase participation?
Indeed, Giné and Mansuri (2018) find that an informational campaign targeted to
women in rural Pakistan in advance of the 2008 elections significantly increases
turnout. Anecdotal accounts reveal that women may have less time for political
participation – in the case of turning out to vote if election-day is a holiday, men
may be freed from their primary work responsibilities in order to participate, but it
means little to nothing for women whose household work responsibilities remain
unaltered by a an official holiday. In a more ad-hoc “intervention”, the former elec-
tion commissioner of India recounts polling officers speeding up women’s lines
after noticing that women were more likely to be deterred by the long lines at a
polling station (Quraishi, 2014).
A second set of explanations points to the limited explanatory power of re-
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source differences between men and women. Atkeson and Rapoport (2003) find
that within the US, gender gaps in political attitude expression persist even after
accounting for a set of resources; they point instead to the importance of gendered
socialization as an explanation. Socialization into particular gender roles that deem
politics as a primarily male domain may inhibit women’s willingness to both accu-
mulate and use the resources necessary for political participation. Moreover, given
similar resources, womenmay evaluate their own capacity to participate differently
from men: Karpowitz and Mendelberg (2014) find that even after controlling for
civic and social abilities, women are less likely to believe that they are able to ef-
fectively speak up at public meetings (qtd. in Preece (2016)). This has important
implications for the types of interventions that could boost women’s participation;
Preece (2016) suggests that “we must address the ’gendered psyche’ that prevents
many women from fully participating in civic life."
In certain contexts, social norms governing what constitutes “appropriate” be-
havior for men and women may constrain women’s participation in politics in ex-
plicit ways. Efforts to boost participation without accounting for these norms may
be ineffective, or even backfire. Gottlieb (2016) documents how a civic education
campaign in rural Mali increased both men and women’s levels of political knowl-
edge but widened the gender gap in actual political participation – she finds evi-
dence that women compensated for deviating from norms by participating in the
civic education programby limiting future participation, and received overt threats
or sanctions from men.
Finally, the gender gap in participation may also be driven by the gender gap
in mobilization to participate. Fox and Lawless (2010) document substantial dif-
ferences across similarly situated men and women in recruitment to run for public
office i.e. women are less likely to be asked to run as candidates. In a survey of
adult men and women in Faisalabad, Pakistan, Khan (2017a) finds that women are
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significantly less likely to report being personally encouraged to vote by a party
worker or candidate or by a friend/relative. In the case of rural India, Prillaman
(2017) suggests that patterns of mobilization that exclude women may obtain in a
system of “family-centered clientelism" whereby parties target households as units
and seek only to mobilize the (usually male) head of household.
The intervention we test in this study seek to increase women’s participation by
explicitly mobilizing women, and easing the constraints around motivation, “gen-
dered psyche” and restrictive social norms described above. We do not differenti-
ate between motivation and resource based explanations, but rather test whether
targeting the mobilization at men, women or both makes a difference.
Context
Pakistan is a federal parliamentary democracy, which haswitnessedmultiple cycles
of authoritarian and democratic rule since independence in 1947. General elections
for the national legislature are held on a first-past-the-post basis for 272 seats. Vot-
ing takes place at polling booths, located within polling stations in constituencies.
Polling booths for men and women are always separate, and there exists a mix of
gender segregated and mixed polling stations.
The last general election of 2013 was a landmark in Pakistan’s democratic his-
tory as it represented the first civilian transfer of power from one democratically
elected government to another. It was the most widely contested election in Pak-
istan’s history andwas deemed by local and international observers to be the freest
and fairest in the country since 1970 (Cookman and Wilder, 2013). However the
potential for true democratic consolidation in Pakistan is undermined by the fact
that while universal franchise, a widely accepted prerequisite for democracy, ex-
ists on paper, it is absent in practice. In some exceptional cases this is a result of
explicit informal agreements between village leaders and political parties . How-
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ever even in the absence of outright bans, women lagged behind men in terms of
voter registration3 and turnout4.
Various actors have been involved in the drive to improve women’s electoral
participation in the 2018 elections, and much of these efforts have been focused
on closing the registration gap5. However, sizable gender gaps in participation ex-
ist even among registered voters, indicating that constraints beyond lack of legal
identification continue to limit women’s participation.
We conduct the study in Pakistan’s second largest city: Lahore. A previous
study conducted by Cheema, Liaqat and Mohmand (2017) in Lahore finds signif-
icant gender gaps in in self-reported turnout among registered voters, along with
gaps in other forms of inter-electoral participation such as communicating with
party workers and local representatives. Moreover, they also find that women are
about 10% less likely to have been contacted by a party representative to vote in the
last local election, which suggests that the mobilization gap is well and alive in this
context.
3The gap in voter registration stems from a gap in legal identification – women over the age of
18 are less likely than men to have a National Identification Card (NIC), which is tied to automatic
inclusion on electoral rolls
4although gender disaggregated turnout data from 2013 is not available, there is a visible gender
gap in turnout in self-reported survey measures, and comparisons of overall turnout at male-only
and female-only polling stations in selected areas
5In 2015, the Free and Fair Elections Network – a coalition of 30 domestic non-governmental
organizations established in 2006 to observe general elections and mobilize voters in Pakistan –
declared a “Women Voters Registration Emergency” calling attention to the issue of millions of
women being missing from electoral rolls. The Election Commission of Pakistan has established a
dedicated “Gender Affairs Wing” to increase and facilitate women’s participation in the electoral
process, importantly this includes a “Female Voter Registration Campaign” started in November




The sample for this study is comprised of 2500 households across 500wards (lowest
local administrative unit). The 500 wards are drawn from 94 Union Councils (local
administrative unit) in the northern part of the city of Lahore. The union councils
are spread across across seven national electoral constituencies (NA-124, 125, 126,
127, 128, 129, 130) and each union council is divided into 6 wards. The ward is our
primary unit of randomization. To draw a sample of 500 wards, we include all 6
wards from a random subset of 30 Union Councils, and randomly select 5 out of 6
wards for inclusion in the study from the remaining 64 Union Councils. Figure 2.1
shows a map of our sample:
Figure 2.1: Sample Union Councils and Wards in Lahore
Within each ward, enumerators survey two individuals (a randomly selected
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man andwoman) in 5 households at baseline giving us a sample of 5000 individuals
(50% male and 50% female) in 2500 households. A household is visited by a pair
of enumerators (one male and one female), each of whom conduct the survey with
a respondent of the same gender.
To select 5 households within a ward, we drop a location pin at a random point
within each ward boundary. The pair of enumerators proceeds to the pin location
for a ward, selects the nearest household to the right for the first survey, then se-
lects four other households in the ward using the right hand rule, selecting the 7th
household to the right of the last household included in the sample. A household
is excluded from the sample if the dwelling is locked/empty, if all members of the
household are not registered to vote, if all members are registered to vote outside
of Lahore, or if there is not at least 1 adult woman and 1 adult man with a CNIC
(Computerized National Identity Card, which is required to vote) available and
consenting to be surveyed.6 In any of these situations, the enumerator skips the
dwelling and proceeds to one immediately to the right of it. Within the household,
respondents are selected by listing all N eligible (over the age of 18 and possess-
ing a CNIC) respondents of a particular gender in order of age. After the listing is
complete, a random number generator programmed in the survey tablet generates
a number n, and the enumerator asks to speakwith the nth listed eligible individual
to conduct a baseline survey, conditional on oral consent.
Random Assignment
We use a two-stage randomization process in which geographical clusters are first
assigned to a treatment status, and then a subset of households within a cluster are
6We restrict the sample to households with individuals who could plausibly cast a vote (have
a CNIC and are registered in Lahore) because our mobilization intervention is conducted after the
preparation of electoral rolls, which means we cannot reasonably expect it to effect changes in voter
registration
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randomly assigned to receive treatment.
• Stage 1: Blocked Random Assignment at Cluster Level
The experimental design is a 2x2 factorial producing 4 possible treatment con-
ditions (see Table 2.1). We assign 500 clusters (wards) to 1 of these 4 treatment
conditions, blocking on Union Council (administrative unit in which wards
are nested)
Table 2.1: Factorial Design
No Women Targeted Women Targeted
No Men Targeted Control T1 (Women Only)
Men Targeted T2 (Men Only) T3 (Women+Men)
• Stage 2: Random Assignment at Household Level
Within each cluster, a random 4/5 of surveyed households within a cluster
receive the treatment assigned at the cluster level.This makes for a partial
population design in which all treated clusters have the same treatment sat-
uration (0.8); the design allows us to estimate spillover effects on untreated
households within treatment clusters.
• Additional: Within Treatment Randomization
Within treatment households, we cross randomize two treatment variations:
1. In a random half of all treated households, mobilizers provide addi-
tional information that the mobilization activity is being conducted at
a larger scale and mobilizers are visiting many households across their
constituency.
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2. In a randomhalf of all treated households that receive themalemobiliza-
tion treatment (T2 and T3), mobilizers explicitly discourage men from
outside the household from joining in the intervention. We do this be-
cause themobilizationwithmen is often conducted outside the premises
of the home and may attract other men from the neighborhood. By ran-
domly controllingwhether non-householdmen can join in or not, we can
assesswhether non-household participationmoderates treatment effects
of T2 and T3.
Figure 2.2 shows the crossed experimental randomizations, with sample sizes
at the ward, household and individual respondent level, reported in parentheses.
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Figure 2.2: Randomization Scheme
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Table 2.2 shows the means and standard errors for several important variables
(measured at baseline) in the control and 3 main treatment groups produced by
the randomization procedure described above. We report the p-values from t-tests
of difference in means between the control and each of the three treatment groups,
and F-statistics from tests of joint significance.
Table 2.2: Statistical Balance between Treatment and Control Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) T-test
Control T1 T2 T3 P-value



























































































N 1250 1250 1250 1250
Clusters 125 125 125 125
F-test of joint significance (F-stat) 0.513 1.483 1.487
F-test, number of observations 2500 2500 2500
Notes: The value displayed for t-tests are p-values. The value displayed for F-tests
are the F-statistics. Standard errors are clustered at variable ward. Fixed effects
using variable uc_no are included in all estimation regressions. All missing values
in balance variables are treated as zero.***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1,
5, and 10 percent critical level.
Note that there appears to be some imbalance on the mean number of adults
in a household; we account for this in household level analysis since we use the
proportion of adults whose turnout could be verified as the outcome measure.
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Intervention Design
The intervention is a 20-25 minute door-to-door mobilization visit to a household
within the 4 weeks prior to the Pakistan General Elections held on 25 July 2018. A
typical visit has the following components:
Introduction
Amobilizer from one of the civil society organizations (Aurat Foundation or South
Asia Partnership) visits a treatment household unannounced and requests to speak
with the individual who was surveyed at baseline. They give a short introduc-
tion about who they are, explicitly stating that their organization is non-partisan.
The mobilizers also had with them letters of approval from the Election Commis-
sion of Pakistan, which they showed to households or individuals who were ini-
tially skeptical of their civil society organization affiliation to assure them of non-
partisanship. If the baseline respondent was unavailable, the mobilizer inquired
when theymight be home and if able to secure a time for later in the same day, they
moved on to other households in the same area and returned to the household later.
If after 3 attempts, they were unable to make contact with the baseline respondent,
they asked to speak with any adult individuals of the same gender as the baseline
respondent who were living in the household, and available at the time. If and
when able to make contact, the mobilizer asked the baseline respondent to gather
all adult individuals of the same genderwhowere living in the household are avail-
able at the time.
Motivational Video
The mobilizer shows the individuals who gathered a short 5 minute video on a
tablet screen. The video follows the narrative of a young woman facing issues of
poor service delivery in her neighborhood, who decides to make her voice heard
by contacting a political candidate, and casting her vote in the election. Her brother
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is shown in an enabling role: he encourages her to take action and also agrees to
help the women in his family get to the women’s polling station on his motorbike.
Informational Leaflets
The mobilizer provides some procedural information about how to find out the
location of one’s polling booth, the process of voting and associated rules as well
as the role of elected officials at the national and provincial level and the symbols
assigned to various parties, using leaflets with pictorial aids. The household mem-
bers are offered copies of the leaflets to keep. The leaflets are reproduced in Ap-
pendix B.1
Mock Ballot Exercise
Themobilizer usesmock ballot papers, ballot boxes and a stamp to show the house-
holdmembers exactly how tomark the ballot, fold the paper and put it in the ballot
box, emphasizing that there are two ballots (a green one for the National Assem-
bly and a white one for the Provincial Assembly) that will be available to voters on
Election Day.
The treatment arms correspond to the different targets of the canvassing visit.
In T1 (women only), the visit is carried out by a female mobilizer and targeted to
the female baseline survey respondent in a treatment household, and other women
present in the household at the time. In T2 (men only), the visit is carried out by a
male mobilizer and targeted to the male baseline survey respondent in a treatment
household, and the other men present in the household at the time. T3 (women
and men) is a combination of T1 and T2: treatment households receive two visits,
one by a female mobilizer targeting the female baseline respondent and women in
the household and another by amale mobilizer targeting themale baseline respon-
dent and other men in the household. The factorial design enables us to identify
the effect of mobilizing women (a comparison of T1 and T3 to T2 and control); mo-
bilizing men (a comparison of T2 and T3 to T1 and control); mobilizing women
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alone (T1 to control); mobilizing men alone (T2 to control); mobilizing men and
women together (
The two visits in T3 are carried out by differentmobilizers, and often at separate
times due to the different schedules at which men are available at home. They
are often also carried out in different places because non-family men are typically
not invited inside the home, especially in one room houses where it is difficult to
maintain gender segregation indoors. Thusmalemobilizer visits in T2 and T3 often
take place outside the home.
Mobilization visits targeted to women in T1 and T3 are carried out by women
while visits targeted to men in T2 and T3 are carried out by men. We use same-
gender mobilizers largely due to gendered norms of segregation in a Pakistani so-
cial context. This also closely mirrors the patterns of contact that occurs between
partisan party workers and voters. In our baseline survey, we ask individual re-
spondents to recall whether their householdwas visited by a political party worker
as part of a door-to-door mobilization during the last election campaign period. As
noted earlier, women report lower rates of contact than men. However, for the re-
spondents who do report contact, we also ask whether they were visited by male
party workers, female party workers, or both. 57% of respondents reporting a visit
say they were visited by both male and female party workers, 40% report being
visited by only male workers, and a mere 3% report being visited by exclusively
female party workers. Among those who report being visited by exclusively male
workers, 76% report that there was no direct contact with women in the household;
this is reversed in the case of respondents reporting a mixed gender visit, among
that group 82% report that there was direct contact with women. This leads us to
believe that accessing women in households requires same-gender mobilizers. Al-
ternatively however, could women mobilizers have contacted men in T2 and T3?
Given the low rates of reported partisan contact with exclusively women party
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workers (only 33 respondents, of which 7 are men report this) we decided that
having women mobilizers contacting men would make for a risky novelty factor.
Moreover, when piloting the intervention, we observed instances of women mobi-
lizers who approached men being told to go speak to women in the household. If




In this study, we seek to explore whether a non-partisan mobilization visit with
motivational and informational component can increase turnout among targeted
individuals and households. Given that women do not often have autonomous de-
cision making power over their decision to participate in politics, we are interested
in whether the visit being targeted at women, men or both matters for effects on
women’s turnout in particular insofar as convincing men about the importance of
women’s vote removes a binding constraint on women’s participation. Addition-
ally, given existing findings of within-household mobilization, it is possible that
mobilizing women (men) positively influences the turnout of other men (women)
in the household through an indirect channel, thus we are also interested in effects
on men’s turnout.
• H1: Mobilization treatments (T1, T2 and T3) increase women’s turnout
• H2: Mobilization treatments (T1, T2 and T3) increase men’s turnout
We are also interested in the effects of the cross-randomized treatment varia-
tions of providing information about the mobilization to treated households and
encouraging privacy (i.e. discouraging men from outside the household from be-
ing part of the intervention), however we are agnostic as to the direction. In the
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case of the information treatment, we may think that introducing common knowl-
edge about the mobilization treatment encourages individuals to change their at-
titudes on the acceptability of women’s electoral participation and further boost
treatment effects. On the other hand, providing this information in the context of
an encouragement to vote intervention could encourage free-riding and reduce a
voters’ sense of pivotality and dampen the treatment effects. Similarly, the encour-
agement of privacy could make the male mobilization more effective if male mem-
bers of a household are more receptive to a message about women’s participation
without other men from the neighborhood present.
• H3: Information about mobilization increases/decreases turnout
• H4: Encouraging privacy increases/decreases turnout
Secondary Hypotheses
Beyond, the main hypotheses on turnout, we are also interested in the testing how
the mobilization campaigns influence the following outcomes. These outcomes
are what we consider to be the potential channels (based on theoretical predictions
and exploratory findings from focus groups) throughwhich the intervention could
have increased women’s turnout:
• men’s support for women’s political participation (logistical help on election
day, and continued expression of support)
• political knowledge
• interest in politics
• sense of political efficacy (women’s own, and as perceived by men)
• household discussions about politics
• perceived norms of women’s political participation
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Data
We draw on two main sources of data for analyses presented in this paper. The
first is a panel survey conducted with 5000 respondents in 2500 households three
months prior to the 2018 General Election at baseline; these households are then
revisited 2 months after the election for the collection of endline data. The turnout
data come from a thumb ink verification exercise conducted in the 2 days following
the general elections (July 26 and 27) during which enumerators attempted made
visits to all 2500 study households and visually verified turnout among household
members by looking at the indelible inkmarksmade on a voter’s thumbby apolling
officer on Election Day. These ink marks begin to fade after 2-3 days which is why
the activity was carried out by a large team of 50 enumerators in the 2 days imme-
diately after the election. In the absence of administrative data of voter records of
turnout , we use this method as an alternative to survey-reported turnout which
is prone to over-reporting. Although there are methods to decrease over-reporting
in a survey context, we may think that the intervention itself could affect individ-
uals’ desire to report that they voted, making such measures especially unreliable.
Due to this we use the thumb ink verification as our main outcome measure. In
the visit to the household following the election, enumerators attempt to relocate
the baseline respondent (who is also the individual to whom the intervention is
primarily targeted, althoughwe consider the intervention to be household level) in
study households, and thus verify turnout for all available household members.
We are able to verify female turnout in 86% and male turnout in 88% of our
baseline sample. In some of these cases, the individual baseline respondentwas not
present at the time of our visit. At the individual level, we were able to 79% of fe-
male baseline respondents and 49% ofmale baseline respondents successfully. The
rate of relocation for male baseline respondents is lower due to limited availability
of working men in a tight timeline. Since the activity had to be completed there
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were no revisit to locate unavailable respondents. We address the issue of sample
attrition in the following section. Finally, we also collect endline data from 97% of
our 2500 study households to test hypotheses related to effects of the intervention




To assess compliancewith the treatment, we estimateOLSmodels to verifywhether
individual men and women baseline respondents in the different treatment cate-
gories recalled a visit from a non partisan canvasser. All models include UC (block)
fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the ward level, which is the level
of randomization for T1, T2 and T3. Results are reported in Table 2.3.
Roughly twomonths afterGeneral Election 2018, respondents in treatment house-
holds were significantly more likely to recall that their household received a can-
vassing visit fromanon-partisan organization in the days leadingup to the election.
Men and women in the T1 and T3 conditions were almost twice as likely to state
that their household received such a visit, benchmarked against a control group
mean of 14 and 13 percent for women and men respectively. Importantly, while
men in the T2 condition were 10 percentage points more likely to state their house-
hold received such a visit, women in households that received T2 were no more
likely than women in control households to recall a visit. This result implies that
men are likely to know about female mobilizers visiting women in the household,
women are not likely to find outwhen amalemobilizer visitsmen in the household.
This is consistent with field reports according to which male mobilizers would of-
ten speak with available men in the household at or just outside the entry-way to
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the household structure and it is plausible that women would not find out about
the structure of the household, while female mobilizers usually conducted the ses-
sion inside the home and while they spoke to women privately, men present in the
home at the time would ostensibly be aware of the visit.
Overall, these reported rates of visit are significantly lower than the compliance
rates revealed by random back-checks conducted by surveyors (separate from the
mobilization team) during the roll-out of the intervention. This discrepancy may
be due to a number of factors, including the possibility that a different household
member received the mobilization visit or that respondents failed to recall the visit
two months after it occurred.
As an additional test, we also ask respondents to recall whether they received
canvassing visits from partisan mobilizers belonging to the main political parties
in the area prior to the election. There is no evidence of treatment households in
either condition reporting more visits by partisan mobilizers (see Columns (2) - (4)
of Table 2.3).
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Table 2.3: Results: Manipulation Checks
Panel A: Women’s Responses









T1 0.098*** 0.028 0.001 -0.005
(0.032) (0.022) (0.018) (0.037)
T2 0.021 0.031 0.009 -0.024
(0.028) (0.022) (0.018) (0.036)
T3 0.112*** 0.010 -0.009 0.029
(0.029) (0.022) (0.018) (0.036)
Within T Control 0.015 0.034 0.009 0.011
(0.026) (0.023) (0.019) (0.034)
UC FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.192 0.135 0.185 0.202
# Observations 2435 2435 2435 2435
Panel B: Men’s Responses
T1 0.113*** 0.011 -0.026 -0.026
(0.029) (0.037) (0.033) (0.031)
T2 0.092*** -0.015 -0.038 -0.047
(0.027) (0.035) (0.032) (0.030)
T3 0.141*** 0.021 -0.006 -0.034
(0.028) (0.035) (0.031) (0.031)
Within T Control 0.053** 0.033 -0.028 -0.024
(0.024) (0.035) (0.031) (0.029)
UC FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.246 0.262 0.234 0.194
# Observations 2434 2434 2434 2434
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the ward level. All columns show
results using OLS estimation. All four outcomes are binary variables. Column (1) is
an indicator for respondent answered yes to the question: “Did representatives from
from Aurat Foundation, SAP-PK or ECP visit your household in the days leading up
to the election?” Columns (2)-(4) are indicators for whether the respondent stated that
a PML-N representative, PTI representative or any other party’s representative respec-
tively visited their household in the days leading up to the election. Controls for the
two cross-randomized treatments (privacy and information) are included. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Turnout
We estimate OLSmodels to identify effects of treatment on turnout among individ-
ualmen andwomen baseline respondents, and on turnout amongmen andwomen
at the household level. The main coefficients of interest are on the treatment indi-
cator variables for T1, T2 and T3. Turnout is verified directly by inspecting the
thumbs of individuals in our sample, as described in Section 2.3. We include in-
dicators for the treatment variations of privacy encouragement and provision of
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information about the mobilization, and for whether a household was assigned to
be a within-treatment control household in a ward. All models include UC (block)
fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the ward level, which is the level
of randomization for T1, T2 and T3. Table 2.4 shows the results.
The mobilization campaign does not appear to affect men’s turnout at the in-
dividual or household level. Mobilizing women (pooling conditions T1 and T3)
does not appear to have significant effect on women’s turnout, except in the case
where men are also mobilized (T3), when it increases the probability of an individ-
ual woman respondent turning out by 6 percentage points (significant at the 10%
level); and increases the proportion of women turning out in a household by 8 per-
centage points (significant at the 5% level). Overall, mobilizing men (pooling con-
ditions T2 and T3) has a positive effect on women’s turnout at the household level,
increasing the proportion of women turning out by 6 percentage points (significant
at the 5% level); mobilizing men alone (T2) also appears to be effective, increasing
the proportion of women turning out by 5.5 percentage points (significant at the
10% level). We also see that the information treatment variation has a consistently
negative effect on women’s turnout across models. The encouragement for privacy
treatment variation does not appear to make a difference. We do not see any effects
on individuals in control householdswithin treatment wards, suggestive that there
are no discernible geographical spillover effects to nearby households.
Taken together, the results suggest that targetingwomenwith a canvassing cam-
paign is insufficient to improvewomen’s turnout in the context of this study. On the
other hand, there is strong evidence that mobilizing men is necessary – and some
suggestive evidence that it is sufficient – to improve the turnout of women living
in their households. Although we see the strongest positive effects on women’s
turnout in the condition where both men and women are targeted with the mobi-
lization campaign, the results do not allow us to conclusively say that mobilizing
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both men and women together is necessary since we cannot reject the equivalence
of T2 (mobilizing men) and T3 (mobilizing both men and women) from our data.
Table 2.4: Turnout among Individual Respondents and Households
Panel A: Women’s Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individual Household Individual Household Individual Household
T1,T3: Women Mobilized 0.022 0.017
(0.022) (0.020)
T2,T3: Men Mobilized 0.039 0.062**
(0.028) (0.025)
T1:Women Only 0.005 0.011
(0.033) (0.029)
T2:Men Only 0.022 0.055*
(0.036) (0.032)
T3: Women and Men 0.062* 0.080**
(0.037) (0.032)
Within T Control 0.016 0.007 0.018 0.016 0.020 0.021
(0.031) (0.026) (0.031) (0.026) (0.034) (0.028)
Information -0.042* -0.038* -0.043* -0.044** -0.045* -0.048**
(0.025) (0.021) (0.025) (0.020) (0.027) (0.022)
Privacy 0.046* 0.028 0.022 -0.012 0.021 -0.012
(0.025) (0.023) (0.031) (0.028) (0.032) (0.028)
Constant 0.892*** 0.729*** 0.896*** 0.729*** 0.898*** 0.726***
(0.054) (0.097) (0.057) (0.091) (0.057) (0.093)
UC FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.114 0.149 0.114 0.151 0.115 0.152
# Observations 1984 2149 1984 2149 1984 2149
Panel B: Men’s Turnout
T1,T3: Women Mobilized 0.022 0.023
(0.028) (0.018)
T2,T3: Men Mobilized -0.008 0.012
(0.033) (0.021)
T1:Women Only 0.026 0.016
(0.040) (0.027)
T2:Men Only -0.004 0.006
(0.043) (0.027)
T3: Women and Men 0.014 0.036
(0.045) (0.028)
Within T Control 0.019 0.023 0.007 0.017 0.018 0.024
(0.037) (0.023) (0.036) (0.022) (0.039) (0.025)
Information 0.002 -0.010 0.009 -0.006 0.003 -0.011
(0.030) (0.018) (0.029) (0.017) (0.031) (0.018)
Privacy -0.022 0.032 -0.017 0.023 -0.017 0.023
(0.035) (0.021) (0.041) (0.024) (0.041) (0.024)
Constant 0.985*** 0.375*** 0.999*** 0.382*** 0.984*** 0.377***
(0.017) (0.052) (0.011) (0.056) (0.027) (0.054)
UC FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.158 0.200 0.157 0.200 0.158 0.201
# Observations 1223 2190 1223 2190 1223 2190




We follow Lee (2009) and use trimming bounds to account for non-random miss-
ingness in our outcome data across treatment groups. The key assumption for the
use of trimming bounds are the monotonicity condition, whereby treatment as-
signment effects attrition in one direction. In our sample, observed attrition is con-
sistently higher in the control group than in treatment groups. We report attrition
corrected results for the turnout outcomes for women at the individual and house-
hold level (where we see significant effects in the main specifications) in Table 2.5
Table 2.5: Attrition Bounds on Women’s Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4)
F(Ind)Upper F(Ind)Lower F(Prop)Upper F(Prop)Lower
T1 0.021 -0.002 0.021 0.005
(0.033) (0.034) (0.029) (0.029)
T2 0.055 0.008 0.058∗ 0.051
(0.035) (0.037) (0.032) (0.031)
T3 0.085∗∗ 0.051 0.084∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗
(0.037) (0.038) (0.032) (0.032)
Within T Cntrl 0.028 0.017 0.024 0.020
(0.033) (0.034) (0.028) (0.028)
Information -0.050∗ -0.041 -0.048∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.022) (0.022)
Privacy 0.006 0.024 -0.005 -0.008
(0.031) (0.032) (0.029) (0.028)
Constant 0.887∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗ 0.732∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.056) (0.093) (0.093)
UC FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1953 1953 2127 2127
Adjusted R2 0.069 0.070 0.104 0.115
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
We find that the the lower bound on the effect of T3 on individual women re-
spondents’ turnout and the lower bound of the effect of T2 on the proportion of
women turning out in a household are not significantly different from zero. How-
ever, the lower and upper bounds of the effect of T3 on proportion of women turn-
ing out in a household remains significantly different from zero and the size of the
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estimated effect is not substantively reduced.
Men’s Behavior beyond Election Day
Do themobilizations campaigns have any effect onmen’s behavior beyond election
day? We designed and implemented a behavioral measure to ascertain whether
the mobilization campaigns results in an increased likelihood of men championing
women’s role in democracy. At the end of our endline survey, we asked the men
in our sample for permission to place a sticker on the entry-way to their residence.
We randomized whether the sticker we offered them was a generic sticker indicat-
ing their support for democracy or a gendered sticker indicating their support for
democracy as well as women’s role in democracy. The design of this measure is
described in detail in Appendix B.2.
Table 2.6 shows results fromOLSmodels estimating the effect of the sticker type
offered, and the treatment condition, on take-up of the sticker by men at endline.
There are no significant differences in take-up across treatment groups for the
generic pro-democracy sticker. We do find that the take-up of the sticker with a
pro-women slogan is lower in the control group by almost 5 percentage points,
with the p-value on the difference between the take-up of the generic and gendered
sticker being lower than 0.05. This differential in take-up rates was not significantly
reduced for men whose households received the women-only (T1) campaign or
men-only (T2) campaign, but is fully alleviated in the conditions where men are
mobilized (T2 and T3). In households that were visited both male and female mo-
bilizers (T3), men were 7.6 percentage points more likely to take up the gendered
sticker compared to those in the control group.
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Table 2.6: Results: Men’s Costly Supportive Behavior
Men’s Costly Support for Women’s Role in Democracy
(1) (2) (3)






















Constant 0.944*** 0.947*** 0.949***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014)
# Observations 2434 2434 2434
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Potential Channels
Weuse questions askedduring an endline survey to investigate the channel through
which the mobilization campaigns may have impacted women’s turnout. We the-
matically group these questions into six indices containing relevant attitudes or
self-reported behavior. These indices are: (i) political knowledge, (ii) interest in
politics, (iii) women’s self-efficacy, (iv) logistical help from men, (v) whether there
was cross-gender political discussion within the household and (vi) the perception
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of descriptive norms about women’s political participation. Figure 2.3 and Table
2.7 show the results.
Figure 2.3: Results on Channels
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Table 2.7: Results: Channels
Panel A: Effects on Women’s Responses













T1 -0.039 0.028 -0.020 -0.070 -0.005 -0.078
(0.073) (0.055) (0.078) (0.073) (0.033) (0.064)
T2 -0.078 0.089 -0.002 -0.032 0.035 0.013
(0.082) (0.055) (0.083) (0.079) (0.035) (0.073)
T3 -0.101 0.039 -0.013 0.158** 0.058* -0.054
(0.079) (0.058) (0.078) (0.078) (0.034) (0.071)
Within T Ctrl -0.047 0.008 0.052 0.090 0.029 0.004
(0.070) (0.048) (0.073) (0.065) (0.032) (0.065)
Constant -1.168*** -0.394*** -0.423 0.204 0.618*** -0.183*
(0.256) (0.149) (0.294) (0.176) (0.080) (0.106)
UC FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.184 0.244 0.134 0.236 0.141 0.194
# Observations 2433 2435 2431 2381 2499 2435
Panel B: Effects on Men’s Responses
T1 -0.013 0.015 -0.005 0.055 0.032 0.049
(0.038) (0.070) (0.072) (0.071) (0.036) (0.084)
T2 -0.009 -0.010 -0.014 0.002 0.006 -0.021
(0.042) (0.069) (0.075) (0.077) (0.036) (0.092)
T3 -0.052 0.133* 0.074 0.173** 0.065* -0.036
(0.046) (0.074) (0.078) (0.076) (0.038) (0.084)
Within T Ctrl -0.019 0.047 -0.030 0.078 0.022 0.011
(0.040) (0.064) (0.064) (0.069) (0.033) (0.077)
Constant 0.704*** 0.563*** -0.293* 0.725*** 0.261** 0.182
(0.095) (0.124) (0.158) (0.118) (0.108) (0.395)
UC FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.155 0.260 0.137 0.185 0.159 0.250
# Observations 2433 2434 2433 2431 2255 2433
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the ward level. All columns show results using OLS estimation. All outcomes are
standardized indices, except for column (5). Column (5) is an indicator variable for whether men (women) stated they discussed politics
with a woman (man) in the household . For the remaining five columns, definitions of the variables composing the indices and results
on each individual component are included in additional appendix tables.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Wefind no evidence that any of the threemobilization campaigns have an effect
on the women’s political knowledge or interest in politics. Similarly, women’s self
efficacy in the political sphere is unaffected by our mobilization campaigns. We
also find no effects on perceptions that women’s political participation has become
more common than before.
The two channels that our mobilization campaign did affect were whether men
and women within a household discussed politics with each other and whether
men provided logistical support to women on the day of the election. Logistical
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help frommenwas 0.17-0.19 standard deviations higher in the group of households
that received both the male and female canvassing visits, as shown in Column (5)
of Table 2.7. Women and men in these households, respectively, were 7.1 and 5.5
percentage points more likely to discuss politics with a household member of the
opposite gender.
Taken together, these results imply that while our the canvassing visits did not
increase women’s knowledge of and interest in politics, nor did they lead to an in-
creased self-efficacy for womenwhen it comes to political matters, they do result in
the removal of important constraints that are related to men - only when both men
and women receive the canvassing visit. Specifically, in households that received
T3, men and women hold more political conversations with each other within the
household, and men are more likely to have provided logistical support on elec-
tion day such as arranging transport and sharing household responsibilities and
waiting for women outside female polling stations.7
2.5 Discussion
In this study we examine the effects of a non-partisan mobilization campaign con-
ducted prior to the Pakistan General Elections on women’s turnout. The campaign
has both motivational and informational components, which seek to redress ob-
served gender gaps in motivation and political information observed at baseline.
We find that the campaign has no effects on women’s turnout when it is targeted
7We test whether this result could be spurious due to the multiple comparisons we are running,
using pooled results shown in Table B.1. Even using the extreme Bonferroni correction which cor-
rects for multiple comparisons by simply dividing the target p-value by the number of comparisons
being made, the p-value of the effect on logistical help from men (0.001) is lower than the target
p-value suggested by the Bonferroni correction (0.003). This calculation uses the fact that we are
computing 18 different p-values - six each for the three treatment groups, this dividing the ‘target’
p-value of 0.05 by 18, which equals 0.0028. The p-value on the effect on political discussion (0.005)
is not below the extreme Bonferroni correction, but is below the target value (0.006) suggested by
the less stringent Benjamini-Hochberg correction.
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only at women, but strong effects when targeted at both men andwomen in house-
holds. We interpret this as suggestive evidence that low levels of women’s political
participation in this context are at least in part a result of real or perceived con-
straints from men in their households, and that increasing these levels requires
engaging those men. On the other hand, engaging men seems to be necessary but
not sufficient: any observed effects of exclusively targeting men as part of the cam-
paign are far weaker. It is only when we engage both that we see movement on
women’s participation.
Moreover, the mobilization campaigns – regardless of target – do not seem to
produce improvement in standardpredictors of political participation amongwomen
i.e. political knowledge, interest, self-efficacy or perceived descriptive norms of
women’s participation more broadly. However, we do observe that when the cam-
paign is targeted at both men and women, treatment households report greater
levels of political discussion between men and women as well as higher levels of
support for women’s participation bymen, as measured by survey reports of logis-
tical help provided by men on election day, and a costly behavioral measure of a
public expression of support for women’s role in democracy two months after the
election.
The findings are consistent with at least two potentially complementary ac-
counts of men’s role in women’s participation. The first is of men as a binding con-
straint onwomen’s participation whomust be convinced to not restrain the women
whomay alreadywant to participate from doing so. The second is of men as neces-
sary enablerswho can be harnessed to amplifymobilizationmessages andmotivate









In this paper, I explore patterns of variation in individual attitudes towards gen-
der equality using survey data collected in Pakistan. I focus on two issue domains:
1) women’s electoral participation and 2) girls’ education. I use original survey
measures of attitudinal support for gender equality which differentiate between
abstract and concrete support for equality, and demonstrate that apparent consen-
sus for equality in the abstract breaks down when it presents a concrete challenge
to accepted gender roles. This insight can help explain persistently unequal out-
comes in the face of what appears to be popular support for equality. In the case of
girls’ education – ostensibly an issue less likely to challenge gender roles – I show
that pre-existing perceptions about levels of gender (in)equality in schooling are
predictive of support for policies that would redress inequality. However, using a
survey experiment, I demonstrate that new information correcting misperceptions
about levels of inequality does not change attitudes. The paper contributes to the
literature on public opinion on gender issues, makes a methodological contribu-
tion to the measurement of such attitudes in a survey context, and advances our
understanding of when changes in support for equalizing reform may be possible.
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3.1 Introduction
In his piece “The Many Faces of Gender Inequality”, Sen (2001) writes “Gender in-
equality is not one homogeneous phenomenon, but a collection of disparate and
interlinked problems.” A cursory glance at the empirical trends in cross-national
and individual-level data support this. In the realm of policy measures that can be
considered to promote greater equality between men and women, Htun and Wel-
don (2018) draw on an original dataset of laws and policies on women’s rights in
seventy countries to demonstrate that “Women’s rights vary not only across coun-
tries but also within them, depending on the issue.” In the realm of individual
attitudes towards equality, Kenny and Patel (2017) draw on survey data from six
waves of the World Values Survey and find that “A single individual can report
strongly different norms about women’s equality in different domains.” Anecdo-
tally, we know that progress towards equality on issues or across domains that we
may think of as “linked” often moves at different paces, and even in different di-
rections. For instance, despite steady economic growth, lower fertility rates and a
closing of the gender gap in school enrollment (all deemed predictive of women’s
labor force participation), women’s labor force participation in India has stagnated
and even declined in recent years (Fletcher, Pande and Moore, 2017). Finally, we
can identify instances of policies and interventions that aim to advance equality,
but either fail to change the status quo, or worse, produce a backlash effect e.g.
Bhalotra, Brulé and Roy (2018) find that legislation guaranteeing equal inheritance
rights for women in India is followed by a worsening of sex ratios; Gottlieb (2016)
finds that while participation in a civics course in Mali increases both men and
women’s political knowledge, it ultimately leads women to withdraw from future
civic participation.
Distinguishing between the different “faces” of gender equality, and identify-
ing how they might be linked has both conceptual and practical importance for
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understanding how progress towards equality occurs, and when we might expect
to observe stalled progress, or backlash. However, as Htun andWeldon (2018) and
Burns and Gallagher (2010) note, existing empirical research on gender equality
in the realm of policy and public opinion tends to either consider a single issue at
a time, or implicitly presume a unified set of issues. Some works which do con-
sider multiple issues tend to classify these issues by topic area e.g. in Theorizing
Feminist Policy Mazur (2002) considers policy formation in post-industrial policies
and groups together policies under the following topics: political representation,
equal employment, reconciliation, family law, and body politics. This is also true of
various "indices" of gender equality e.g. the most widely used Global Gender Gap
Index tracks country performance on subindices grouped by topic areas: Economic
Participation and Opportunity, Educational Attainment, Health and Survival, and
Political Empowerment. There are of course exceptions and explicit attempts by
scholars to develop common frameworks to classify gender issues in ways other
than topic area, and I explore these in the following section.
In this paper, I present two case studies of individual attitudes towards gender
equality in two issue domains in Pakistan: 1) women’s electoral participation, and
2) girls education. I demonstrate how the framework of equity and roles– origi-
nally developed to understand policy change on gender issues in the United States
– can be useful in understanding variation and potential for change in individual
attitudes for these two issues in particular, and other issues more broadly. I also
draw on original survey measures that differentiate between abstract and concrete
support for equality and show that abstract support for equality may break down
in the face of concrete scenarios, which may help explain persisting unequal out-
comes in the face of what seems like consensus around equality. Importantly, I
argue that the "breaking point" for such consensus is when situations challenge
existing gender roles. In the case of education – an issue I classify as being about
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equity rather than roles – I use a survey experiment to show that pre-existing per-
ceptions of levels of (in)equality are predictive of support for policies to redress
inequality. However, the provision of accurate information that corrects misper-
ceptions does not increase support in the expected direction and men and women
respond differently to this information. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2
reviews existing approaches to the classification of gender issue domains and re-
sulting predictions on equal attitudes and policy support, Section 3.3 and Section
3.4 present the respective cases, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Conceptual Frameworks for Gender Issues
What is a Gender Issue?
The first question at hand is what constitutes a “gender issue", or interest. This is
closely tied to the question of what constitutes women’s issues or interests. Weldon
(2011) notes that feminist scholars today generally reject the notion of a set of inter-
ests shared by women as a group, in summary because presuming a shared group
identity among women runs the risk of essentialism (Celis et al., 2014) and igno-
rance of other forms of identities that may be crucial in shaping interests (Baldez,
2011). Nevertheless, Sanbonmatsu (2002) defines gender issues as ones that “affect
women as a group and/or affect the traditional division of labor between men and
women.” In her study of public debate and policy on women’s rights, Wolbrecht
(2000) defines women’s rights as issues for which “women are the intended bene-
ficiary, constituency, or object.” This is a narrower definition than Sanbonmatsu’s,
since it specifies the condition of intent to affect women in some way. Molyneux
(1985) takes the ”common denominator” approach stating that: “womenmay have
certain general interests in common. These can be called gender interests to differ-
entiate them from the false homogeneity imposed by the notion of women’s inter-
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ests."
For this paper, I define gender issues as ones that concern some aspect of gen-
der inequality. This has considerable overlap with the definitions discussed earlier,
but is intended to be more expansive. To illustrate: in Khan (2017b), I document a
gap in men and women’s priorities over public goods and services in a survey con-
ducted in Faisalabad, Pakistan and ask what makes this this gap (and the gaps ob-
served in different contexts of sub-SaharanAfrica and India) a “gender-based” gap.
I argue that the fact that these differences in priorities appear to be driven by at-
tributes of social structures (specifically norms of unequal division of labor), rather
than individual attributes of individual men and and women is what makes them
“gender-based differences.” Under this definition, distributive policies affecting
the provision of goods and services that provide disproportionate/unequal bene-
fits tomen or womenwould also constitute “gender issues." Thesemay be distribu-
tive policies where women are not the explicitly intended beneficiary, constituency
or object (as per Wolbrecht), but they nevertheless affect women as a group. These
are also policies that may not alter the division of labor between men and women
(as per Sanbonmatsu), but their disproportionate impact on women is indeed due
to underlying conditions of inequality in this division of labor.
Typologies of Gender Issues
Existing typologies of gender issues, which are not based purely on issue domain,
have some explicit or implicit sense of the processes throughwhich these issues are
articulated and politicized. For instance, Gelb and Palley (1982) use the framework
of roles and equity to understand public policy progress on women’s rights in the
United States:
Role equity issues are those policies which extend rights now en-
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joyed by other groups (men, other minorities) to women and which ap-
pear to be relatively delineated or narrow in their implications, permit-
ting policymakers to seek advantage with feminist groups and voters
with little cost or controversy. In contrast, role change issues appear
to produce change in the dependent female role of wife, mother, and
homemaker, holding out the potential of greater sexual freedom and in-
dependence in a variety of contexts. The latter issues are fraught with
greater political pitfalls, including perceived threats to existing values,
in turn creating visible and often powerful opposition.
However, the distinction between issues of role and equity has less to do with
the intrinsic content of the issue, but rather how it is framed and understood at a
particular time. Burns andGallagher (2010) note, “Where an issue stands -whether
it is about roles or equity or both - depends on the tools ordinary Americans use
to think about the particular issue. We do not think it is possible to ‘read’ equity
or roles from an actual policy.” Burns and Gallagher (2010) extend this framework
to understand public opinion, rather than policy progress, on gender issues. Their
definition of a gender issue is also tied to public opinion, such they define an issue
as being ’about gender’ if “people use gendered tools, or cultural ideas about gen-
der, to think about it." Again, this is narrower than the definition I propose under
which an issue that has disproportionate effects for men and women – regardless
of whether these individuals think of it through a gendered lens – would qualify
as a gender issue.
Although they do not explicitly state this, Burns and Gallagher’s conception of
a gender issue implies some degree of consciousness of gender on the part of indi-
viduals who are thinking about it. Molyneux (1985) actively engages this question
of consciousness in her treatment of gender interests, inwhich she differentiates be-
tween “strategic” and “practical” gender interests. In her typology, strategic inter-
ests are defined deductively: “that is, from the analysis of women’s subordination
and from the formulation of an alternative, more satisfactory set of arrangements to
those which exists” while practical interests are defined inductively: “[they] arise
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from the concrete conditions of women’s positioning within the gender division
of labor." The former involves consciousness of a larger end goal of equality and
comprises the interests often classified as feminist, while the latter is a response
to immediate needs, without necessarily the consciousness of this end goal. The
conceptual distinction between interest types is then in the process by which the
interests are formed or articulated, rather than one of issue content.
Predicting Individual Attitudes and Policy Change
Burns and Gallagher make two empirical predictions based on the roles and equity
framework: first, that public support for policies of equity is likely to be higher than
that for roles, and second that the gender gap in public support for issues of roles
is likely to be smaller than that for issues of equity. The first prediction mirrors
Gelb and Palley’s idea of when policy success is more likely; the rationale for the
second lies in the understanding gender roles persist at least in part because they
are accommodated, internalized and reinforced by women themselves.
A first caveat to the roles vs. equity typology of issues is of course that as gender
roles evolve, issues that may previously have been about roles can become issues of
equity. Second, if we think that relevant actors are aware of the difficulty (ease) of
moving public opinion on issues of roles (equity), there are clear incentives to frame
policy in terms of being about roles or equity, depending on the desired outcome.
This second point somewhat undermines the predictive power of this typology for
policy success – at the extreme it means that policy success will by definition in-
volve issues of equity because successful changes are framed thus. Mansbridge
(1986)’s analysis of the failed ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment in the
United States illustrates this dynamic. However, in this case the proponents of the
policy – arguably to their detriment – overstated the potential impacts of the pol-
icy on transforming gender roles, contributing, in Mansbridge’s view, to the failed
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ratification:
...if the ERA had been ratified, the Supreme Court would have been
unlikely to use it to bring about major changes in the relations between
American men and women, at least in the foreseeable future. Nor did
theAmericanpublicwant any significant change in gender roles, whether
at work, at home, or in society at large. The groups that fought for the
ERA and the groups that fought against it, however, had a stake in be-
lieving that the ERA would produce those kinds of changes. With both
the proponents and opponents of the ERAexaggerating the likely effects
of ERA, legislators in wavering states became convinced that the ERA
might, in fact, produce important substantive changes - and the neces-
sary votes were lost. [...] The irony in all this is that the ERAwould have
had much less substantive effect than either proponents or opponents
claimed.”
The case of the ERA illustrates the shortcomings of thinking of the equity/role
typology as binary, even in a snapshot of time. In this case a policy tool that was
unlikely to produce role change, was strategically framed by opponents as having
the potential to do so. Proponents could perhaps have had greater traction by fram-
ing it as lacking such potential, but they chose an expressive frame of potential for
transformative change. Importantly, Mansbridge’s analysis of failure of ratification
is not just about the ERA being framed as a role issue, but it being framed as such
in the absence of the requisite public demand for role change at the time. This ap-
proach implies a useful scope condition on Galb and Palley’s prediction that role
change policies are less to succeed: they are indeed less likely to succeed,when there
is no public demand for transformation of roles. Alternatively we might think that the
existence and persistence of certain roles is enough to imply that there is no de-
mand for role-change, thus bringing us back to the idea that role change issues are
by definition more contentious.
Mansbridge approaches the question of demand for role change empirically,
rather than inferring a lack of appetite for change from the persistence of roles in
society. She argues that apparent public support for the ERA in surveys reflected
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support of general principles of equality in the abstract, rather than support for con-
crete changes in gender roles . She shows that among individuals who expressed
support for the ERA in surveys conducted during the campaign for ratification,
substantial numbers also held traditional views about women’s roles.
Americans have always favored ‘rights’ in the abstract. The princi-
ple that government should not deny anyone ‘equal rights’ commands
widespread approval. But citizens who approve this principle are of-
ten quite conservative in practice. They support the principle of equal
rights only insofar as they think it is compatible with the status quo.
I draw onMansbridge’s analysis to make a simple and generally applicable pre-
diction about public opinion on gender issues: individuals’ equitable attitudes on
a gender issue are sensitive to threats to status quo gender roles. Put another way,
individuals’ support for what may prima facie seem like an “equity” issue may
break down once a challenge to gender roles is introduced. While this threat may
be likely in some issue domains more than others, no issue domain is intrinsically
about equity or roles, and can be constructed either way. In the following two
sections, I explore how this unfolds in two issue domains in Pakistan: women’s
electoral participation, and girls’ schooling.
3.3 Women’s Electoral Participation in Pakistan
Equity or Roles?
Electoral politics in Pakistan remains a heavily male dominated affair. Men out-
number women by far in the pool of candidates, representatives, party leadership
positions, party workers, voters, and even on electoral rolls. Women are less likely
to be contacted by party workers and less likely to attend community “corner”
meetings or rallies i.e. the main forms of party activity and outreach in the lead-up
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to an election. (See Table 1.3 which documents these gaps in a survey sample of
800 households in Faisalabad, Pakistan). Although these patterns of women’s ex-
clusion from political activities, and underrepresentation in political positions are
not unique to Pakistan, the size of the participation gap is especially pronounced
in the Pakistani case. Figure 3.1 visualizes data from the most recent round of the
World Values Survey, showing the gap between men and women who report turn-
ing out to vote in national elections in their respective countries: Pakistan fares the
worst among democracies surveyed in this wave.
Figure 3.1: Gender Gaps in Self Reported Turnout, WVS Wave 6 (2010-14)
Issues of women’s participation in electoral politics in Pakistan have sometimes
been framed in terms of equity, insofar as equity issues are about “extend[ing]
rights now enjoyed by other groups (men, other minorities) to women and which
appear to be relatively delineated or narrow in their implications” (Gelb and Pal-
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ley, 1982). This is true for the question ofwomen’s underrepresentation on electoral
rolls and voter registration lists. Following the 2013 elections in Pakistan, civil so-
ciety groups organized around the slogan of a “Women Voters Registration Emer-
gency.” While we would imagine that it would be in the interest of political parties
to encouragewomen to register as voters and take on organizing registration drives,
it is in fact the non-partisan ElectionCommission of Pakistan (ECP) alongwith non-
partisan civil society organizations who have taken the bulk of action. A clue that
the issue ofwomen’s electoral participationwas framed as one of equity rather than
gender roles for this purpose, is that it has sometimes been grouped together with
the participation of “other marginalized groups” e.g. the ECP created a “’Gender
and Disability Electoral Working Group (GDEW)’ with the aim of main streaming
women and other marginalized group in to the political process”1; similarly for
Election Day 2018, the ECP created a dedicated “Gender Desk” tasked with receiv-
ing complaints from “women, persons with Disabilities, transgender, minorities,
female candidates, female polling staff and female polling agents” 2. This suggests
a consideration of the question of women’s exclusion along with broader inequal-
ities in the electorate, rather than approaching it in terms of the specific barriers
(potentially gender-role related barriers) faced by women.
On the side of women’s descriptive representation, Pakistan has had quotas for
women in the form of reserved seats in local government bodies and in provin-
cial and national legislatures. However, these reserved seats are mostly (except in
some cases for local bodies) filled by indirect rather than direct election i.e. they
are awarded to parties in proportion of the general unreserved seats won by the
1Election Commission of Pakistan. “Initiatives Taken by the Gender Affairs Wing, Election
Commission of Pakistan”, URL: https://www.ecp.gov.pk/frmGenericPage.aspx?
PageID=3171
2Election Commission of Pakistan. “General Elections 2018: A Gender Desk has been set up for
General Elections 2018 in the control room of ECP Secretariat”, URL: https://www.ecp.gov.
pk/PrintDocument.aspx?PressId=65435&type=Text
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party in an election. Among other things, this means that women who fill these
seats do not directly contest elections or have a “constituency of their own” (Mufti
and Jalalzai, 2017). Importantly, it was not until 2017 that there was any legal pro-
vision for parties to fulfill candidate quotas for women. Htun (2004) documents
the empirical pattern in institutions of mandated representation around the world:
women generally receive candidate quotas and ethnic minorities receive legisla-
tive reservation. Pakistan, along with a few other cases, is a departure from that
general pattern in that it provides women and religious minorities the same rem-
edy of legislative reservations. Htun (2004) also draws an analytical distinction
between these types of institutions, comparing candidate quotas for women to a
“class action” and legislative reservations for ethnic minorities as a “group right”:
“Women seeking quotas aim to have their different position absorbed by univer-
salistic institutions. Ethnic minorities demanding reservations want their partic-
ularism recognized and legitimized.” One of the explanations for Pakistan’s (and
other countries’) departure from the pattern described by Htun is historical lega-
cies: “countries with traditions of ethnic reservations have given reserved seats
to women.” However, regardless of the origin, the design of the quota institution
means that at least until 2017 women’s descriptive representation in Pakistan was
considered together with that of minorities, as an issue of group rights rather than
one of assimilation of women into mainstream political parties. This conception
and institutional design maps more closely to the framing of women’s descriptive
representation as an equity issue rather than one of role change. Candidate quo-
tas which mandate parties to field women candidates to contest general seats, run
public campaigns and cultivate a constituency of their own would ostensibly in-
volve greater potential for role transformation for women than the institution of
reserved seats, and as per Gelb and Palley (1982)’s expectation, be met with greater
resistance.
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These instances of women’s political participation framed as questions of eq-
uity (i.e. in the case of voter registration drives and legislative reservations) are
instances where initiatives actually took place or where policy exists. We might
contrast this with instances where gender roles were in fact threatened or chal-
lenged in the domain of women’s electoral participation. Most relevant is the 2017
Elections Act which for the first time required parties to field women candidates:
Section 206 of the Act requires that when selecting candidates for general seats,
parties “shall ensure at least five per cent representation of women candidates.”
Among other things, the requirement to field women as candidates implies that
women would have to run public-facing campaigns targeted to voters, thus chal-
lenging norms of women’s role in public space in a way that a women vying for an
indirectly elected reserved seat who do not need to campaign for votes do not do.
Parties minimally complied with this requirement i.e. all parties fielded the requi-
site five percent but very few exceeded this, and when they did it was minimally
in excess of this requirement 3. However, some parties evaded these public image
implications of this requirement by quite literally keepingwomen candidates’ faces
off of campaign posters:
• “In Peshawar no one seems to know ’Ms Yasmeen’, the candidate without a
last name and without a face, the space is left blank on campaign posters” 4
• “Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf’s Syeda Zahra Basit Bokhari is running a very odd
political campaign. Her election posters carry her name but her husband’s
picture” 5
3Election Commission of Pakistan, Statement Showing the Five PercentWomen in General Seats
Under Section 206 of the Election Act, 2017. 6 July 2018, URL: https://www.ecp.gov.pk/
PrintDocument.aspx?PressId=55373&type=PDF
4Jahangir, Munizae, “The invisible female candidates shut out of Pakistan’s elections”. The
Guardian. 24 July 2018, URL: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/
2018/jul/24/female-candidates-pakistan-elections
5Shah, Benazir. “A female candidate’s faceless election campaign”.
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• “Recently, posters of a Member National Assembly (MNA) candidate Mem-
oona Hamid contesting from PP-149 constituency of Pakistan came to light
without her face on them.” 6
What these accounts demonstrate anecdotally is that equality inmen andwomen’s
political participation has been, on occasion, constructed as an issue of equity.
However, when women’s participation constitutes a challenge to status quo roles,
it is met with resistance. This is true across different types of participation i.e. we
may think that certain activities like becoming a party worker or running for office
– which involve long term engagement – challenge status quo gender roles moreso
than others. However, it may also be true for the particular form that a certain type
of participation takes due to institutional design e.g. women’s descriptive represen-
tation and participation in the electoral arena as representatives through reserved
seats may be more palatable than their representation through candidate quotas.
In the following section, I demonstrate how this logic plays out in public attitudes
towards women’s participation specifically, how attitudes towards “appropriate-
ness” of women’s political participation are sensitive to the type of activity, and I
argue, the extent to which that activity poses a challenge to gender roles.
Attitudes towards Women’s Political Participation
In an original survey7 conducted with 2500 households in Lahore, Pakistan just
prior to the 2018 National Elections in Pakistan, we ask male and female respon-
GEO News. 20 July 2018, URL: https://www.geo.tv/latest/
203944-a-female-candidates-faceless-election-campaign
6“Pakistan General Elections 2018: Faces of women candidates missing from posters”.
India Today. July 23, 2018. URL: https://www.indiatoday.in/home-top/story/
pakistan-general-elections-2018-faces-of-women-candidates-missing-from-posters-1294013-2018-07-23
7Details of the survey are in Section 2.3
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dents their opinion on how appropriate it is for women to participate in each of five
types of political activities that are particularly salient at election time:
1. Voting
2. Discussing politics
3. Becoming a political worker
4. Attend a rally
5. Stand as a Candidate
The respondents can answerAppropriate, NeitherAppropriate nor Inappropri-
ate or Inappropriate. Figure 3.2 shows the proportion of male and female respon-
dents who think it is appropriate for women to participate in each of 5 activities.
Despite the observed gender gap in voting, there appears to be near consensus
among men and women that it is in fact appropriate for women to vote. Relative to
becoming a political worker or standing as a candidate, which involve longer term
and repeated engagement, voting is a "one-off" activity, and unlikely to alter the
course of a women’s life in the way that taking on a political career would. More-
over, voting usually takes place in separate polling booths for men and women,
with female polling agents staffing the women’s booths, ensuring that norms of
gender segregation remain unviolated even as women are momentarily engaged
in a public political activity 8. The perceived appropriateness of becoming a polit-
ical worker or a candidate, or even discussing politics, is lower among both men
and women, with a significantly higher proportion of women than men thinking
these activities are appropriate.
8The Election Commission of Pakistan sets up 3 types of polling stations: women’s, men’s and
mixed. However in the case of mixed stations, men and women’s polling booths within the station
are always separate
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Figure 3.2: Respondent Attitudes towards Appropriateness of Women’s Political
Participation, by type of participation and gender
Attending rallies seems to be the outlier, with only 13% and 17% of women and
men respectively thinking it is an appropriate activity for women. This is puzzling
given that it may seem similar to voting in that it is a short term, one-off form of
engagement. While it does involves women’s presence in public space in a way
that may be circumvented in the case of voting (with separate polling booths, and
stations), it is not immediately clear why it would be deemed less appropriate than
women becoming political workers or candidates, which involves public engage-
ment and exposure over a longer time. The reason is at least in part context specific:
women’s participation at rallies in particular received a lot of negativemedia cover-
age in the lead-up to the 2018 election. Whilewomen’s presence at political rallies is
not an anomaly, in the lead-up to the 2018 elections, there were at least four highly
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publicized instances of harassment of women attendees at rallies for a major po-
litical party (the Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaf (PTI)) in Islamabad, Lahore, Multan and
Peshawar 9 10.
One of the most serious incidents occurred in a rally held in Lahore in 2016,
which iswhere this surveywas conducted. On the one hand, PTI leadership blamed
party workers of the incumbent party (Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz - PML-N),
for example in the case of harassment at a rally in Peshawar, a PTI legislator al-
leged that the harassed woman herself was a PML-N party worker: “PTI leader
Naeem ul Haq while speaking to Geo News shifted the blame on political oppo-
nents and said that the woman was sent by them to create this situation”11. On the
other hand, the PML-N leadership responded by victim-blaming the women at the
rally. Most egregiously, the then prime minister Nawaz Sharif made a public state-
ment made a statement to this effect saying: “Did you see what womenwere doing
in yesterday’s gathering?” and later, addressing women at a PML-N rally stated:
“’Thankfully you are not like the women who attend PTI rallies” 12. Another legis-
lator from the PML-N Rana Sanaullah said (of women participating in PTI rallies):
“The dance moves of these women show which kind of families they belong to” 13.
Thus, at the time the survey was conducted, rally attendance by women was a
highly charged topic, and had been framed by the incumbent government in terms
of women’s character and appropriate roles. Burns and Gallagher (2010) note that
9“Several booked for harassing PTI women”. DAWN News. 03 May 2016. URL: https://
www.dawn.com/news/1255929
10“Another incident of female harassment at PTI rally”. The News Inter-
national. 09 May 2016. URL: https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/
118633-incident-female-harassment-PTI-Pakistan
11“Another incident of female harassment at PTI rally”. The News Inter-
national. 09 May 2016. URL: https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/
118633-incident-female-harassment-PTI-Pakistan




“scholars have have begun to think, for example, about three kinds of context as
activators of gendered predispositions,” one of these are contexts in which political
parties prime gender thinking. Although the question of women’s participation in
all types of activities is an explicitly gendered issue, rally attendance is an example
of an activity where parties in Pakistan purposively framed women’s participation
in terms of gendered norms of appropriate behavior.
Sensitivity of Attitudes to Role Threat
The case of unusually low agreement on rally attendance (relative to other forms
of public political participation, including ones that would be far more costly in
terms of time) as appropriate behavior for women is an example of how parties can
frame a particular domain or activity as a threat to gender roles. In this section, I
draw on survey questions about specific circumstances (not related to party fram-
ing) surrounding women’s voting to demonstrate that even on an activity where
there is consensus on appropriateness among men and women (96% of women
and 92% of men think it is appropriate for women to vote), this consensus is sensi-
tive to particular situations where women’s role may be threatened. Anecdotally,
we know extreme instances of women being banned from voting altogether in Pak-
istan14. Additionally, changes in procedural details that threatenwomen’s exposure
in public space can also depress women’s turnout: in recent 2019 elections held in
the previously Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan which are
nowmerged into the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, there were reports of women
coming to polling stations, but ending up not voting due to closed-circuit TV cam-
eras in polling stations, and an aversion to being filmed. To explore this systemati-
cally within the survey sample, we first ask respondents about whether they think
voting is appropriate for women, and then ask whether it is appropriate for men to
14see Section 1.3 for a full discussion of these constraints)
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stop or prevent women from voting under any of the following circumstances:
1. Women are expected to vote differently than men
2. Long lines are expected on polling day
3. Voting interferes with women’s household duties
4. Fights are expected to break out on polling day
These conditions/circumstances were selected based on topics that came up in
exploratory focus group discussions and interviews with men and women in La-
hore. The first represents the possibility of women’s autonomous voting, which
may pose a greater threat to women’s roles than would women simply “doubling”
men’s vote. The second speaks both to different time constraints for men and
women on polling day –while election day is a public holiday, women are of course
not free from usual housework on election day and may thus be less available to
wait a long time to vote. Moreover, long lines often mean that women have to
stand outside the polling station itself in a public space rather than the enclosed
gender segregated area of a polling booth. Interference with household duties is
a direct statement of part of what is implied in the second condition of long lines
and women’s inability to pass on duties of childcare and housework to others on
polling day in order to vote. The final condition relates to security concerns, which
may be a greater constraint on women’s participation than men’s, in part due to
masculine norms of protection. Figure 3.3 shows the proportion of male and fe-
male respondents who think it is appropriate for men to stop women from voting
under each of these circumstances.
For each of these conditions a substantial proportion of respondents i.e. at least
18% agree that is it appropriate for men to stop women from voting. This is far
higher than the proportion who think it is inappropriate for women to vote at
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Figure 3.3: Respondent Attitudes towards Appropriateness of Men Stopping
Women From Voting, by situation and gender
all (8% of men think this, see Figure 3.2. Moreover, for each condition – except
the threat to security – there is a gender gap in perception of appropriateness i.e.
women aremore likely to say it is inappropriate formen to stopwomen fromvoting.
These patterns reveal the breakdown of an abstract consensus on the appropriate-
ness of a particular type of participation in the face of concrete threats to gender
norms of behavior and presence in public space.
3.4 Girls’ Schooling in Pakistan
Equity or Roles?
Most countries around theworld have achieved gender parity in primary education
(as measured by the ratio of girls to boys enrollment) in recent years, with girls’
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enrollment exceeding that of boys in some contexts. Cross-country data shows
that gender gaps in enrollment tend to close as countries develop economically:
There is a pronounced male bias in educational attainment at low lev-
els of economic development, which is absent among richer societies
[...] The pattern seen in the cross-section of countries is also seen over
time in most poor countries as their economies grow: girls’ education
increases at a faster rate than boys’, narrowing the gender gap. (Heath
and Jayachandran, 2018)
School enrollment rates for girls and boys have risen in Pakistan in recent years.
However, gender gaps in enrollment do persist at the primary school level, are ex-
acerbated at the secondary school level, and exist alongside gender gaps in learn-
ing and achievement even when girls are in school (Annual Status of Education Re-
port 2018, 2019). Public attitudes towards girls’ education seem largely supportive.
In 2014, following the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to then seventeen year old
Malala Yousafzai for her advocacy of girls’ education in Pakistan, Pew publicized
results from its Global Attitudes Survey with the headline: “Most Pakistanis agree
with Malala on educating girls” (Wike 2014). In a nationally representative survey,
they find that 86%of respondents agree that education is equally important for both
girls and boys, and that this consensus holds among men and women respondents
alike.
Existing evidence suggests that education can be transformative in girls’ lives
in the developing world: Heath and Jayachandran (2018) document the effects on
increased labor market participation, delayedmarriage and delayed fertility. These
are certainly the sort of changes that could be considered a threat to status quo gen-
der roles in the context of Pakistan. However, this may be more true of secondary-
level and university level schooling. Even at the primary level, some campaigns for
the promotion of girls’ education have taken a role-consistent tone i.e. emphasizing
the gains to the “family” or society of educating girls rather than focusing on the
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potential for the transformation of the lives of girls themselves 15. In a recent study
of parental preferences for girls’ education in rural Rajasthan, India, Adams and
Andrew (2019) find that a key motivation for parents for investing girls’ higher ed-
ucation is the expectation that this will yield returns (in terms of a desirable match)
on the marriage market: “This insight is likely important in explaining why access
to education, girls’ completed education, and age of marriage have all increased
substantially over the past 20 years.” This trend reflects a motivation for girls’ ed-
ucation that is congruent with traditional gender roles: it may explain support for
higher education that could regardless result in role change in the long run, but
is not perceived by parents as doing so. In this way, if education is framed as and
understood to be congruent with rather than challenging gender roles (regardless
of whether it actually is), we may be likely to see high public support for equality,
and the existing gaps in enrollment interpreted as a question of equity rather than
roles.
Given steady trends of increasing girls enrollment and the potential for un-
derstanding education even at higher levels as role-congruent rather than role-
changing, and high general public support for equality in this domain, we may
think that remaining gaps in enrollment and achievement are likely to be perceived
as issues of equity. However, research on the causes of the gender gap in enrollment
points to factors that implicate gender roles. For instance, Andrabi et al. (2008) trace
how distance from a school affects girls and boys differently:
[...]every additional 500 meters increase in the distance to the closest
school results in a large drop in enrollment, and more so for girls living
500 meters from the school are 15 percentage points less likely to attend
than those living next door. The drop-off is much smaller for boys, and
15These gains are not imaginary – there is a vast literature documenting the returns of mothers’
education on a host of outcomes for children; a recent paper documents how "the oldest sister’s
schooling significantly improves younger brothers’ literacy, numeracy and schooling" in Pakistan
(Qureshi, 2018)
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in fact, distance to school accounts for the bulk of the gender differential
in enrollment in Pakistan. (Andrabi et al., 2008)
The gendered nature of distance as a constraint for school-going age girls speaks
to the relevance of gender roles for the question of access to education: even if ob-
taining education itself (at least at primary levels) is not seen as a threat to gender
roles and rather a question of equity, the exposure to public spaces and perceived
threat of harassment involved in traveling to the physical school involves concerns
around roles and appropriateness. While constraints on adult women’s mobility
are more commonly documented in this particular context 16, it seems that similar
constraints apply to girls as early as primary school age. In addition, Jacoby (2011)
show how, in rural Pakistan, it is social, and not just physical distance that mat-
ters: “Entry into primary school is substantially discouraged when girls have to
cross settlement boundaries to attend, irrespective of the distance they would have
to travel.” This again points to the primacy of contextual gender roles, whereby
women (and girls’) mobility is additionally constrained by the threat of loss of sta-
tus from crossing a village boundary.
Given that the role-related constraint has to do with access to schooling rather
than the effects of schooling itself, I would expect individuals who support girls’
schooling to also support measures that could overcome these constraints e.g. bet-
ter transportation for girls or more girls schools in their neighborhood to enable
easier access. In the following section, I draw on survey evidence to explore public
attitudes towards girls schooling and such policy initiatives.
16Mumtaz and Salway (2005) examines how this affects women’s uptake of reproductive health
services
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Attitudes towards Equality and Support for Concrete Policy
Measures
I draw on a survey conducted in the Faisalabad District of Punjab, Pakistan in 2017
with 800 respondents (400 married men and 400 married women)17 in which re-
spondents are asked the following questions about their views on the importance
of education:
• Girls’ primary education is just as important as boys’ education. To what
extent do you agree with this statement?
• Primary education aside, girls’ higher education is just as important as boys’
education. To what extent do you agree with this statement?
For both statements, respondents can choose to StronglyAgree, SomewhatAgree,
Somewhat Disagree or Strongly Disagree. Figure 3.4 shows the results in terms of
proportions of respondents who strongly or somewhat agree with the statements:
there appears to be high consensus over the principle of equal importance of ed-
ucation for girls and boys, shared among men and women, for primary as well as
higher education. However, it is worth noting that the support for equal impor-
tance of higher education is significantly (though perhaps not substantively) lower
than for primary in the case of male, but not female, respondents.
Does the high support for equal importance of girls’ education translate into
support for the kind of policymeasures thatwouldproduce equal outcomes? Given
different baseline levels of enrollment, efforts to close the gapwould have to involve
measures that specifically target girls enrollment rather than universal measures
that aim to improve everyone’s enrollment. In the survey, respondents are asked
17Sampling details for the survey can be found in Appendix A.2
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Figure 3.4: Respondent Attitudes towards importance of schooling for girls and
boys, by level of schooling and gender
if they think the government should should prioritize them over more universal
measures. The exact question wording is as follows:
• There are some things that the provincial govt. can do to improve enroll-
ment for everyone, like improving existing schools’ infrastructure, making
sure teachers are attending There are other things that the govt. can do to im-
prove the enrollment of girls like girls stipend programs, building more girls
schools, providing better transport. Which do you think the govt. should pri-
oritize?18 [Things that improve everyone’s enrollment / Things that improve
girls’ enrollment]
Two of the three measures (building more girls schools and providing better
transport) mentioned as ones that would increase girls enrollment specifically ad-
dress the distance constraint which is considered key in explaining the gender gap.
The othermeasure: a girls stipend program is a pre-existing scheme (Female School
18All these are examples of actions taken by the provincial government in the past
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Stipend Program - FSSP) introduced by the Punjab government in 2003 which pro-
vides a conditional cash transfer to families of girls who regularly attend middle
school. While the survey question phrasing might imply an overly strict tradeoff
(improving things for everyone or just for girls), it accurately reflects the the kinds
of trade-offs over distribution and prioritization governments make when decid-
ing how to allocate resources: in the case of Khyber Pakthunkhwa (a province with
especially large gaps in enrollment), a provincial government official made an pre-
budget announcement committing 70% of the provincial education budget to girls
education in May 2019. The party now in power – the Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaf (PTI)
included the following language in their 2018 national manifesto: “We will priori-
tise establishment and upgradation of girls’ schools and provide stipends to girls
and women for continuing their education” (PTI Manifesto, 2018); the manifestos
of the main opposition parties the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N)19
and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)20 also included specific measures for girls’
education. Do these political commitments enjoy public support?
Figure 3.521 shows the results from the survey question. There is overall very
low support for prioritizing measures that would exclusively target girls enroll-
ment over universal measures, and there does not appear to be a difference among
men and women respondents on this issue.
19The PML-N manifesto states: a “promise” to “ensure equitable access to education for girls’
20The PPP manifesto states: "In order to increase retention of students beyond primary level,
particularly that of girls, primary schools will be upgraded to at least lower secondary level. In
addition, more resources will be allocated for girls’ education, and stipends will be awarded to girls
to complete secondary school and HSSC"
21Note that Figure 3.5 only visualizes data collected from respondents who do not receive the
information treatment described in Section 3.4
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Figure 3.5: Respondent stated support for prioritizing targeted measures that
improve girls enrollment over universal measures, by gender
Perceptions of Inequality and Policy Attitudes
What might explain the disconnect between overall agreement on the equal impor-
tance of girls education, and the lack of support for measures that could potentially
produce equality in this domain? The trend in public opinion appears to parallel
Mansbridge’s assessment of American’s support for the principle of equal rights,
without support for any concrete change in the status quo. Here, however, the pro-
posed policies I ask about are not geared towards a broader transformation of roles,
but quite narrow and tied to the specific outcome of equality, over which there is
prima facie consensus between men and women (i.e. following a logic of equity
rather than roles as per Gelb and Palley (1982)).
One possibility for lack of support for policy might be that while there is gen-
uine support for equality in this domain, respondents do not think there is a need
for such policy to produce equal outcomes. They may value equal outcomes in
schooling for girls and boys, but either think that existing gaps will close over time
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on their ownwithout government intervention, and/or theymightmisperceive the
level of pre-existing equality and think that the status-quo is not unequal. To ex-
plore the potential of misperception of inequality, I ask respondents the following
question about perceived levels of inequality:
• Do you think more girls go to school than boys in Punjab? [More girls go to
school/Equal numbers of girls and boys/Fewer girls go to school]
Figure 3.6 shows the distribution of responses. Most respondents underesti-
mate the level of inequality: contrary to reality on ground, a plurality thinks that
either more girls are in school than boys, or that enrollment numbers are equal.
Figure 3.6: Respondent (mis)perceptions of existing gaps in enrollment
There may be a number of reasons why so many respondents misperceive the
level of inequality in enrollment at the provincial level. First is a possibility that
the question is interpreted to be about attendance rather than enrollment. While I
do not have data on gender gaps in school attendance it is possible that this gap is
smaller than the gap in enrollment. Second, a steady trend of increase in girls’ en-
rollment (as described in Section 3.4) may lead respondents to think that equality
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has already been achieved 22. Third, it may be the case that (some) respondents are
incorrectly extrapolating a situation of relative equality in their local environment
to the provincial level – the district (Faislabad) in which this survey was conducted
performs especially well compared to other districts in the country on overall edu-
cational outcomes, and on gender parity in these outcomes23. Finally, respondents’
views of equality in outcomes may be driven by their attitudes towards gender
equality more broadly, and other predispositions. For instance, in the case of the
United States, perceptions of progress towards equality are heavily partisan: Re-
publicans are far more likely than Democrats to say that women have it easier than
men (or that there is no difference) today in the United States (Horowitz, Parker
and Stepler, 2017).
Given the broad misperceptions of levels of inequality in this domain, the low
support for initiatives promoting girls’ schooling are perhaps unsurprising: re-
spondents simply do not see a need for policy redressal of inequality. Are respon-
dents’ who accurately perceive the existence inequality in this domain more likely
to support policy that prioritizes girls’ enrollment? Figure 3.724 shows the distri-
bution of policy support by perception of level of inequality, and gender.
For women, the highest levels of support for prioritizing measures for girls en-
22We can observe similar trends in American survey respondents’ views of the current state of
gender equality: when asked whether men or women have it easier today in the United States, 9%
of respondents say that women have it easier and a majority (56%) say that there is no difference;
when asked aboutwhethermorework is needed to bring about gender equality in theUnited States,
39% say that the country has been “about right” and 10% say it has gone too far when it comes to
giving equal rights to women. An important distinction is that these questions are about general
progress towards equality rather than a domain specific question about progress towards a specific
outcome, but it illustrates a somewhat similar phenomenon
23Alif Ailaan, an education non-profit, produces an annual ranking of districts based on how
well they perform on indicators of education. They calculate a gender parity score for each district
based on 1) Total girls enrollment as percentage of boys enrollment 2) Girls retention from primary
to middle school as a percentage of boys retention from primary to middle and 3) Girls retention
from middle school to high school as percentage of boys retention. Faisalabad ranked 2nd highest
among 158 districts in 2017
24Note that Figure 3.7 only visualizes data collected from respondents who do not receive the
information treatment described in Section 3.4
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Figure 3.7: Respondent stated support for prioritizing targeted measures that
improve girls enrollment over universal measures, by perceived level of inequality
and gender
rollment (36%) are among the women who (accurately) think that fewer girls are
enrolled in school than boys in their province. Support among women who un-
derestimate the level of inequality i.e. think that enrollment is equal or that more
girls go to school than boys is relatively lower (21% and 25% respectively). This
pattern is consistent with the idea that respondents who are generally supportive
of the principle of equality (and almost all women agree that education is equally
important for girls and boys)would bemore likely to demand policies that promote
equal outcomes if they think there is a greater need for them (i.e. if they think that
real outcomes are in fact unequal). However, this is not the case for men. Only 11%
of men who (accurately) think that fewer girls are enrolled in school than boys in
their province are supportive of initiatives that could redress this inequality, this is
not substantively different from the men who (inaccurately) think that more girls
are enrolled in school than boys (9% of whom support suchmeasures). The highest
support (25%) is amongmenwho think the status quo is actually equal. It is only in
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this category that men’s support is as high as that of women. While it is difficult to
make inferences from these simple distributions, the patterns are suggestive of the
idea that the relationship between perceptions of gendered inequality and support
for policy measures may look different for women and men.
Can Accurate Information about Levels of Inequality Shift Policy
Support?
Perceptions of levels of inequality may themselves be driven by attitudes and pre-
dispositions that predict support for equalizing policy measures, as apparent from
the case of partisan biases in the perception of gender inequality in theUnited States
(Horowitz, Parker and Stepler, 2017). Thus, to better identify the relationship be-
tween perceptions and support, I embed a randomized informational treatment in
the survey inwhich a random half of survey respondents are provided information
about actual levels of school enrollment in their province before being asked about
their support formeasures that would promote girls enrollment25. The information
treatment is as follows:
• “Actually, in Punjab, more boys go to school than girls. 8 million (80 lakh26)
boys between the age of 5 and 16 are enrolled in school, compared to just 6.7
million girls (67 lakh). There is a difference of nearly 13 lakh.”
Do respondents accurately update their perceptions in response to this informa-
tion? To assess this, I ask the respondents who receive the information treatment
the following question as a manipulation check:
25Note that Figures 3.5 and 3.7 in the sections above only visualize data collected from respon-
dents who did not receive this information treatment (the control group)
26Lakh/Lac is one hundred thousand units
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• Is this gap, larger than what you thought, smaller than what you thought or
about the same?
If the information treatment works, we would expect respondents who previ-
ously answered that more or equal numbers of boys and girls go to school to re-
spond that the gap is in fact larger than what they thought. For those who accu-
rately answered that fewer girls go to school, any of the response options could
indicate “accurate” updating depending on their prior perception of the exact size
of the gap (which I do not collect data on).
I find that among the respondents who initially said that more girls go to school
and then received the treatment, 73% respond that this gap in enrollment is larger
than what they thought; for respondents who initially thought enrollment was
equal, 77% respond that the gap is larger than what they thought after receiving
the information. Among respondents who accurately reported thinking that fewer
girls go to school, 47% respond that the gap is larger than what they thought and
36% respond that it is about the same as they initially thought after receiving the
information. By and large, respondents seem to update in the expected direction
given their prior perception after receiving accurate information.
Table 3.1 shows results from regressions of reported support for prioritizing
measures for girls enrollment (the dependent variable is coded 1 if respondent
chooses "Things that improve girls’ enrollment", and 0 if the respondent chooses
"Things that improve everyone’s enrollment") on adummyvariable indicatingwhether
the respondent received the randomized informational treatment. The first column
shows the simple bivariate relationship controlling for respondent gender; all mod-
els include settlement fixed effects 27, the second third and fourth models include
an indicator forwhether the respondent (mis)perceived the status-quo as being one
27These are added to account for the settlement level factors that may affect respondents’ per-
ception of inequality e.g. one area may have more/less girls’ schools
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where more or equal numbers of girls are enrolled in school, and an interaction of
the information treatment with these pre-treatment perceptions. The omitted cate-
gory is the respondents in the control condition (who do not receive the treatment)
and who accurately perceive that fewer girls go to school in the Punjab province.
Figure 3.8 graphs the coefficients from the third and fourth column (separate mod-
els for female and male respondents)
Table 3.1: Effects of Accurate Information on Support for Initiatives for Girls’
Schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled Pooled Women Men
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Female 0.040 0.044
(0.028) (0.028)
Info Treatment 0.014 0.045 -0.192* 0.139*
(0.028) (0.065) (0.116) (0.075)
Perception: Equal Nos 0.027 -0.131 0.112
(0.059) (0.094) (0.074)
Perception: More Girls -0.053 -0.162* 0.041
(0.056) (0.089) (0.069)
Equal*InfoTreat -0.014 0.239* -0.123
(0.082) (0.136) (0.103)
MoreGirls*InfoTreat -0.059 0.112 -0.060
(0.077) (0.131) (0.093)
Constant 0.133** 0.154** 0.346*** 0.038
(0.060) (0.072) (0.110) (0.091)
Settlement FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.030 0.044 0.068 0.136
# Observations 800.000 800.000 400.000 400.000
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Figure 3.8: Effects of Accurate Information on Support for Initiatives for Girls’
Schooling
The results from the pooled regression models (Model 1 and Model 2) do not
support that the informational treatment about true levels of gender gaps in school
enrollment had any effects on respondents’ support for initiatives that would sup-
port girls’ enrollment, even when we account for respondents’ pre-treatment per-
ceptions of the gender gap (Model 2). However, the separate models for female
(Model 3) andmale respondents (Model 4) reveal different patterns. Amongwomen,
the informational treatment has a significant negative effect when delivered to the
respondents who correctly perceived a gender gap (in favor of boys) in the sta-
tus quo levels of school enrollment before receiving the treatment. The relation-
ship we observe in 3.7 is reflected in the coefficients on (mis)perception of status
quo equality or a (mis)perception that the status quo enrollment is skewed in fa-
vor of girls: these (mis)perceptions are correlated with lower levels of support for
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initiatives promoting girls enrollment. When delivered to the women who under-
estimate gender inequality in enrollment, the informational treatment appears to
have a positive effect – although this is only statistically significant for the women
who misperceive the status quo as being equal. In the case of men, the exact op-
posite patterns seems to hold true. Among men, the informational treatment has
a significant positive effect when delivered to the respondents who correctly per-
ceived a gender gap (in favor of boys) in the status quo levels of school enrollment.
Unlike women, men who misperceive the level of inequality (either perceive that
there is status equality, or that the situation is skewed in favor of girls) are no more
likely (and if anything less likely) to support initiatives that promote girls enroll-
ment when they receive accurate information that goes against their priors.
It seems that although 1) both men and women in this sample are in consensus
on the abstract idea that education is equally important for boys and girls (Figure
3.4)) that this support for equality in the abstract nevertheless does not translate
into high support for the kind of policymeasures that would actually achieve equal
outcomes in this domain (Figure 3.5), the factors that might lead men and women
to support concrete measures might be different. Specifically, for women, learn-
ing about the true level of inequality in this particular domain and updating their
beliefs about the status quo seems to translate into greater support for inequality-
reducing measures. This is not true for men, even though information about the
true level of inequality leads them to update their beliefs about these levels, it does
not make them more supportive of inequality-reducing measures. The men who
accurately perceive a gender gap in the status quo to begin with, are in fact even
more likely to increase support for policy initiatives when reminded of these true
levels, even if it does not involve updating their prior beliefs.
Exploring why information about the true extent of gender inequality has dif-
ferent effects on men and women’s policy preference – particularly in a domain
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where there is relative agreement that equality is desirable at least in the abstract
– is beyond the scope of this paper. However, simply documenting that this gen-
dered response to information exists is potentially valuable. First, it is possible that
men and women’s prior beliefs about the status quo are driven by different factors,
that may or may not also inform their policy preferences. For instance, if women’s
beliefs about the level are informed mostly by knowledge while men’s beliefs are
informed not just by knowledge but also some other predispositions towards equal-
ity, new information about levelsmay not be sufficient to effect change in the latter’s
policy preferences.
3.5 Discussion
There are well-documented gender gaps around the world in access, participation
and outcomes across a number of social, economic and political domains ranging
from primary education, to the labor market and electoral politics. These gaps are
are particularly stark in Pakistan, a country that ranks 148th out of 149 countries on
the Global Gender Gap Index. In this paper I focus on two domains: electoral pol-
itics and education and demonstrate how these gaps may be understood through
the framework of gender equity and gender role concerns.
Public attitudes towards women’s political participation vary across specific
forms of participation i.e. activities that pose a challenge to gender roles enjoy
lower support and perception of appropriateness than do activities such as vot-
ing, that may be undertaken in a ”role-coherent” manner. Nevertheless, even for a
certain activity type, there is variation in perception of appropriateness based on
whether the circumstances surrounding it potentially challenge gender roles e.g. if
women’s voting leads to neglect of household duties, or exposure in public space.
Importantly the perception of the extent to which an activity is considered role-
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coherent is manipulable and context specific, as seen in the case of unusually low
support for women’s participation in rallies.
In the case of education, an issue more likely to follow the logic of equity, I find
that perception of levels of inequality seems to matter for individuals’ support for
policy redressal of inequities in education access. However, the effect of percep-
tions of levels of inequality varies for men and women, suggesting that the may
be a gendered response on issues of equity. This finding speaks to Burns and Gal-
lagher (2010) prediction that there is usually more of a gender gap on issues that
are often more strongly about roles than equity. While I do not find a gender gap
in support for policy redressal of inequality in enrollment, I do find a gender gap
in the extent to which this support is responsive to new information about levels
of pre-existing equality.
Public attitudes towards questions of gender equality in different domains are
most often either considered as a unified set of attitude towards gender equality
(e.g. they are combined in something akin to an equality index), or separately by is-
sue domain. The roles and equity framework is an alternative to this treatment and
provides a common lens through which to understand attitudes towards equality
and make predictions within and across issue domains.
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A.1 Punjab Local Government Act, Chapter II, Parts 9
& 10
9. Delimitation of Union Councils
(1) A Union Council shall be an area consisting of one or more revenue estates
or, in the case of an area where revision of settlement under the law has not taken
place, one or more census villages or, in the case of an urban area, a census block or
blocks as determined for purposes of the last preceding census or a census block
or blocks and a revenue estate or revenue estates, delimited and notified as such by
the Election Commission.
(2) For purposes of delimitation of a Union Council:
(a) the area of a Union Council shall be a territorial unity;
(b) the boundaries of a Union Council shall not cross the limits of the Metropolitan
Corporation, a Municipal Corporation or a District Council; and
(c) the population of Union Councils within a local government shall, as far as pos-
sible, be uniform.
(3) The Election Commission shall delimit a Union Council into six wards for the
election of members on the general seats.]
(4) For purposes of delimitation of a ward of a Union Council:
(a) a ward shall consist of a village, one or more adjoining villages or, in case of an
urban area, a census block or adjoining census blocks;
(b) the boundaries of a ward shall not cross the limits of the Union Council; and
(c) the population of wards within a Union Council shall, as far as possible, be uni-
form.]
10. Delimitation of wards in Municipal Committees
1) The Election Commission shall delimit a Municipal Committee into wards for
election of members of the Municipal Committee on general seats.
(2) For purposes of delimitation of a Municipal Committee:
(a) a ward shall consist of a census block or adjoining census blocks;
(b) the boundaries of a ward shall not cross the limits of the Municipal Committee;
and
(c) the population of wards within a Municipal Committee shall, as far as possible,
be uniform.
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A.2 Household Sampling Procedure
This describes the sampling procedure used to select 50 households within an elec-
toral block/ward:
• Locate the following 5 predetermined landmarks in the dwelling
– Health (BHU, if none, select dispensary, if none, select pvt. clinic)
– Education (largest govt. primary school, if none, select largest pvt. pri-
mary school)
– Mosque (main mosque)
– Main Market area
– Transformer
• Begin with any of these landmarks, use the right hand rule select every 3rd
household until 10 households are surveyed. So, e.g. start at the mainmarket
area, begin to walk right and select household #3, #6, #9, #12, #15, #18, #21,
#24, #27, #30
• Again, male and female enumerators are to alternate so that male enumera-
tors takes #3, #9, #15, #21, #27 and female enumerators takes #6, #12, #18, #24,
#30 (or the other way around). The gender alternation is crucial otherwise
one-gender surveys will be non-randomly clustered.
• After 10 households from the first landmark using the rule have been com-
pleted, go to the next landmark and repeat the procedure.
• By the end 50 households will be selected in this way randomly taking 10
households starting from all 5 landmarks
• If no one can be interviewed at the randomly selected household e.g. dwelling
is empty, no one was available, selected person did not provide consent, then
select the neighboringdwelling immediately to the LEFTof the selecteddwelling
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B.1 Intervention Materials
Figure B.1: Procedural Information Leaflet
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Figure B.2: Political Knowledge Leaflet
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Figure B.3: Mock Ballot Paper
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B.2 Design of Costly Behavioral Measure
Male respondents were randomly selected into being offered one of the two stick-
ers. If the respondent agreed, the enumerator placed the sticker on the entry-way
to the respondent’s residence. The Urdu text on the sticker at the top translates
to: “Strong Democracy, Strong Pakistan” x 2. The Urdu text on the bottom sticker
translates to “Strong Democracy, Strong Pakistan” and “Democracy is incomplete
without the inclusion of women.”
Figure B.4: Stickers offered to Male Respondents
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B.3 Additional Tables
Table B.1: Results: Channels













T1 -0.027 0.021 -0.013 -0.009 0.015 -0.015
(0.042) (0.049) (0.057) (0.053) (0.026) (0.060)
T2 -0.044 0.039 -0.009 -0.014 0.021 -0.004
(0.048) (0.048) (0.059) (0.055) (0.025) (0.066)
T3 -0.077 0.086* 0.030 0.165*** 0.064** -0.045
(0.047) (0.050) (0.060) (0.057) (0.026) (0.061)
Within T Control -0.034 0.027 0.011 0.084* 0.024 0.007
(0.042) (0.043) (0.052) (0.050) (0.023) (0.056)
Constant -0.231* 0.084 -0.358*** 0.465*** 0.467*** -0.001
(0.131) (0.130) (0.119) (0.105) (0.047) (0.165)
UC FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.074 0.103 0.079 0.120 0.077 0.143
# Observations 4866 4869 4864 4812 4754 4868
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the ward level. All columns show results using OLS estimation. All outcomes are
standardized indices, except for column (1) and column (6). Column (1) is an indicator variables for whether the respondent stated their
household received a visit from a non-partisan mobilizer in the days leading up to the election. Column (6) is an indicator variable for
whether men (women) stated they discussed politics with a household member of the opposite gender. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table B.2: Results: Channels with baseline controls













T1 -0.016 0.033 -0.005 -0.006 0.015 -0.005
(0.043) (0.050) (0.056) (0.053) (0.026) (0.058)
T2 -0.054 0.041 -0.002 -0.012 0.027 -0.002
(0.048) (0.048) (0.058) (0.055) (0.025) (0.066)
T3 -0.089* 0.068 0.030 0.162*** 0.063** -0.055
(0.049) (0.049) (0.059) (0.057) (0.026) (0.061)
Within T Control -0.028 0.029 0.018 0.085* 0.025 0.013
(0.043) (0.043) (0.051) (0.050) (0.023) (0.056)
Constant -0.048 0.246** -0.334*** 0.502*** 0.431*** 0.062
(0.105) (0.099) (0.122) (0.100) (0.045) (0.152)
UC FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.172 0.205 0.090 0.124 0.084 0.175
# Observations 4866 4869 4864 4812 4754 4868
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the ward level. All outcomes are standardized indices, except for column (1) and column
(6). Column (1) is an indicator variables for whether the respondent stated their household received a visit from a non-partisan mobilizer
in the days leading up to the election. Column (6) is an indicator variable for whether men (women) stated they discussed politics with a
householdmember of the opposite gender. Additionally, controls for demographic variables and baselinemeasures of political knowledge,
interest in politics, women’s self-efficacy and political discussions between men and women in the household are included. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table B.3: Treatment Effects on Political Knowledge
Panel A: Women’s Knowledge











T1 -0.036 -0.038 0.007 -0.072** 0.019
(0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.070)
T2 -0.041 -0.017 0.020 -0.060* -0.031
(0.027) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.075)
T3 -0.006 -0.028 0.030 -0.070** -0.072
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.071)
Within T Control -0.042 0.014 0.052* -0.042 -0.059
(0.028) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.073)
Constant 0.186*** 0.337*** 0.861*** 0.090*** -0.948**
(0.070) (0.130) (0.073) (0.033) (0.375)
UC FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.125 0.248 0.096 0.155 0.230
# Observations 2423 2421 2408 2417 2428
Panel B: Men’s Knowledge
T1 0.071** -0.028* 0.001 -0.085** 0.031
(0.031) (0.014) (0.036) (0.037) (0.031)
T2 0.086*** -0.003 -0.019 -0.045 0.019
(0.031) (0.011) (0.035) (0.037) (0.031)
T3 0.057* 0.004 -0.028 -0.051 -0.018
(0.031) (0.011) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037)
Within T Control 0.027 -0.015 -0.002 -0.055 0.006
(0.032) (0.014) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035)
Constant 0.710*** 1.011*** 0.567*** 0.531*** 0.606***
(0.172) (0.010) (0.170) (0.083) (0.028)
UC FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.203 0.083 0.263 0.219 0.146
# Observations 2427 2433 2413 2431 2433
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the ward level. All columns show results
using OLS estimation. All five outcomes used in this table are combined in a standardized index
to form the outcome variable for Column (1) of Table 2.7. Outcome for column (1) is an indicator
for whether the respondent correctly repeated the Election Commission of Pakistan SMS short-
code for checking one’s voter registration. Column (2) is an indicator for whether the respondent
correctly stated that elections for provincial and national assemblies take place on the same day
(as opposed to different days). Column (3) is an indicator for whether the respondent correctly
stated that a voter’s signature is not required on the ballot paper. Column (4) is an indicator for
whether the respondent correctly stated that a Presiding Officer’s signature are required on the
ballot paper. Column (5) is a standardized index comprising of four variables, each being an
indicator for whether the respondent correctly linked a popular political slogan with a political
party. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table B.4: Treatment Effects on Interest in Politics








T1 0.038 0.051 -0.039
(0.054) (0.053) (0.067)
T2 0.026 0.118** 0.061
(0.048) (0.050) (0.067)
T3 0.045 0.095* -0.060
(0.051) (0.051) (0.066)
Within T Control 0.012 0.043 -0.029
(0.048) (0.049) (0.065)
Constant -0.117* -0.245*** -0.602**
(0.063) (0.059) (0.296)
UC FEs Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.293 0.260 0.142
# Observations 2435 2435 2384
Panel B: Men’s Interest
T1 -0.025 0.074 -0.034
(0.064) (0.069) (0.068)
T2 -0.080 0.078 -0.021
(0.061) (0.062) (0.070)
T3 0.055 0.187*** 0.084
(0.064) (0.071) (0.069)
Within T Control 0.014 0.069 0.029
(0.061) (0.066) (0.067)
Constant 0.350* 0.836*** 0.215
(0.185) (0.106) (0.173)
UC FEs Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.253 0.194 0.227
# Observations 2434 2434 2413
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at theward level. All columns show
results using OLS estimation and all three outcomes are standardized. All three out-
comes used in this table are combined into a standardized index to form the outcome
variable for Column (2) of Table 2.7. Column (1) uses responses to the question “How
interested are you in political TV shows?” as outcome. Column (2) uses responses to
the question “How interested are you in political issues / topics or problems?” Col-
umn (3) uses responses to the question “How interested would you say youwere in the
2018 Election?”. All three questions are asked on a Likert scale. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01
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Table B.5: Treatment Effects on Self Efficacy








T1 -0.022 -0.045 -0.012
(0.072) (0.075) (0.068)
T2 -0.056 -0.013 -0.020
(0.072) (0.076) (0.066)
T3 -0.038 -0.038 -0.027
(0.065) (0.072) (0.063)
Within T Control 0.041 0.124 -0.076
(0.066) (0.076) (0.067)
Constant -0.789*** -0.310 0.377
(0.271) (0.332) (0.240)
UC FEs Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.227 0.087 0.132
# Observations 2411 2363 2410
Panel B: Men’s View of Women’s Efficacy
T1 -0.046 -0.006 0.007
(0.077) (0.071) (0.067)
T2 -0.078 0.114 -0.122*
(0.076) (0.073) (0.065)
T3 -0.032 0.068 0.034
(0.079) (0.071) (0.070)
Within T Control -0.045 0.011 -0.054
(0.071) (0.072) (0.068)
Constant -0.636** -0.023 0.171
(0.266) (0.336) (0.323)
UC FEs Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.200 0.125 0.113
# Observations 2429 2423 2429
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the ward level. All columns show
results using OLS estimation and all three outcomes are standardized. All three outcomes
used in this table are combined into a standardized index to form the outcome variable
for Column (3) of Table 2.7. For women (Panel A), the questions used as outcomes are
agreement on a likert scale with the following statements respectively: (1) I consider my-
self well-qualified to participate in politics as a citizen, (2) I think that I am well-informed
about the process of how to cast my vote in the next election and (disagreement with) (3)
Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really
understand what’s going on. For men (Panel B), the questions are the same, except they
are asked about the women in their households e.g. “I consider women in my household
to be well-qualified to participate in politics as a citizen.” * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table B.6: Treatment Effects on Men’s Logistical Support








T1 -0.101 0.041 -0.114
(0.067) (0.065) (0.074)
T2 -0.049 -0.003 -0.006
(0.064) (0.067) (0.075)
T3 0.106 0.138** 0.131*
(0.066) (0.064) (0.073)
Within T Control 0.057 0.058 0.091
(0.062) (0.063) (0.070)
Constant 0.183 -0.242 0.527***
(0.125) (0.235) (0.117)
UC FEs Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.224 0.240 0.161
# Observations 2374 2377 2372
Panel B: Men’s Responses
T1 0.046 -0.049 0.108
(0.065) (0.069) (0.071)
T2 0.038 -0.144** 0.155**
(0.070) (0.065) (0.070)
T3 0.150** 0.089 0.213***
(0.066) (0.069) (0.070)
Within T Control 0.068 0.006 0.108
(0.068) (0.067) (0.070)
Constant 0.668*** 0.592** 0.491**
(0.137) (0.263) (0.191)
UC FEs Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.168 0.186 0.137
# Observations 2418 2394 2359
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the ward level. All
columns show results using OLS estimation. All three outcomes used in
this table are indicator variables combined into a standardized index to
form the outcome variable for Column (4) of Table 2.7. For women (Panel
A), the questions used as outcomes are responses to the question “How
willing were the men in your household to help with the following things
before the election/on election day?” For men (Panel B), the questions
used as outcome are yes or no responses to the question “Did you do any
of the following before the election/on election day?” The relevant actions
for each column respectively are (1) Organizing transport/taking women
to the polling station on election day, (2) Sharing household duties so that
women had time to vote and (3) Waiting for women at the polling station.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table B.7: Treatment Effects on the Perception of Descriptive Norms around
Women’s Political Participation









T1 -0.057 -0.086 -0.028
(0.066) (0.071) (0.061)
T2 0.035 -0.034 0.075
(0.064) (0.073) (0.068)
T3 0.015 -0.094 0.003
(0.063) (0.073) (0.065)
Within T Control 0.019 -0.024 0.013
(0.067) (0.073) (0.066)
Constant 0.873*** -0.760*** -0.530***
(0.109) (0.136) (0.136)
UC FEs Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.284 0.199 0.184
# Observations 2435 2435 2435
Panel B: Men’s Responses
T1 0.014 0.093 0.019
(0.070) (0.082) (0.075)
T2 0.021 0.015 -0.077
(0.071) (0.083) (0.075)
T3 -0.029 0.026 -0.073
(0.068) (0.078) (0.069)
Within T Control 0.023 0.035 -0.032
(0.067) (0.074) (0.070)
Constant -0.266 0.052 0.627***
(0.484) (0.218) (0.206)
UC FEs Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.256 0.199 0.273
# Observations 2433 2433 2433
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the ward level. All
columns show results using OLS estimation. All three outcomes used in
this table are indicator variables combined into a standardized index to
form the outcome variable for Column (6) of Table 2.7. The questions ask
respondents to think of 5 women in their neighborhood and answer how
many of them (1) Cast their vote in 2018 elections, (2) Participate in a corner
meeting and (3) Go to a political rally. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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